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Geoff England*
Brian Hansen
Greg North

Recent Developments in
Labour Law in Nova Scotia

In the eighteen months since "Recent Developments in Labour Law
in Nova Scotia" were last noted, the labour scene, both in Nova
Scotia and generally across Canada, has been very active. Both the
Supreme Court of Nova Scotia and the Supreme Court of Canada
have been involved in several interesting decisions, and of
particular interest is the fact that the Nova Scotia Labour Relations
Board has issued several written decisions involving sections that
hitherto had not been extensively considered.
The following subject areas are noted here: first, unfair labour
practices, where the Board has come down with several interesting
decisions; second, the ongoing program of certification, where in
the last twelve months Board pre-hearing vote procedure has come
under attack, new amendments to the Trade Union Act have been
passed and the Nova Scotia Board has made decisions dealing with
revocation of certification and alteration of terms and conditions of
employment during the freeze period; third, administration of the
collective agreement, where several decisions of the Supreme Court
of Canada should prove of interest to readers and the Ontario Court
of Appeal decision in the Zwelling' case has been noted as we feel
that it is likely to have substantial impact in this province; fourth,
several decisions arising out of the C.L.C. -sponsored National Day
of Protest, including one in Nova Scotia, dealing with the right of
unions to engage in political strikes; finally, arbitration, where both
the Nova Scotia Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Canada
have had to deal with general questions relating to arbitration and
judicial review.
We have not found it possible to deal with all interesting
decisions on this occasion. Thus, we have not dealt with the
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accreditation of the Construction Association Management Labour
Bureau in Cape Breton. 2 Nor have we included a discussion of the
Board's Balcom-Chittik3 successor rights case because, although a
very important decision, it will be dealt with in an article in the next
issue of the journal. Finally, we have decided, after some
consideration, not to deal with the plethora of cases involving
collective agreements and the Anti-Inflation Board and Guidelines.
No such problems seem to have been judicially considered in Nova
Scotia but we have footnoted the decisions from other provinces of
which we are aware.
UnfairLabourPractices

Unfair labour practices have not frequently come before the Nova
Scotia Labour Relations Board. When the last "Recent Development in Labour Law" was written for this journal, there were no
decisions of the Board in this area that the writers considered worthy
of direct comment. This is not to say that the Board did not receive
allegations of unfair labour practices but for the most part they arose
in the context of certification applications and the exercise of the
Board's discretion under section 24(2)(c). During the last twelve
2. L.R.B. No. 428C, dated April 5, 1977. This order essentially reflects the first
Accreditation Order, which related to the industrial and commercial sector of
mainland Nova Scotia (L.R.B. No. 392C,dated January 29, 1976 discussed briefly
at (1976), 2 Dal.L.J. 791 at 863). Two other decisions of interest in the
construction industry might be briefly noted. First, in L.R.B. No. 411C, dated
October 7, 1976, the Panel held that the supply of employees by a union to an
employer covered by an accreditation order but not a member of the accredited
bargaining agent contrary to section 99 of the Act does not constitute an unfair
labour practice under section 52 in that such a supply does not amount to
interference with the formation or administration of an employers' organization.
Second, section 103 of the Act has recently been interpreted by an arbitrator
appointed by the Minister pursuant to the section. In Construction Association
Management Labour Bureau Limited v. I.B.E.W., Local 625, May 11, 1977
(Richard), one of the parties had applied to the Minister of Labour without first
discussing the actual nomination of an arbitrator by consent with the other party. It
was alleged on a preliminary objection that there was no "failure to comply with
subsection 3" so that any appointment under section 103(4) was invalid. The
arbitrator rejected this on the basis that, the purpose of section 103 being speedy
arbitration, it would frustrate the intent of the legislation (either by accident or
design) to require the parties specifically to discuss and reject an arbitrator by
midnight of the date giving rise to the grievance in order to avail themselves of
section 103. "Doing nothing must be regarded as a form of non-compliance which
would give either party" the right to proceed under the Act.
3. L.R.B. No. 2367, June 1, 1977. (Section 29). See also L.R.B. No. 417C for a
discussion of the single employer concept under section 20.
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months, however, three unfair labour practice cases came directly
for the Board's consideration and in each the Board took the
opportunity to discuss the impact of the relevant sections of the Act.
In the first, Peter MacIntyre v. Usen Fisheries4 , the Board had to
consider an employer unfair labour practice. In the second and
third, the McCulloch5 and Crowell 6 cases, it was the union that was
under attack. As the first occasions on which the Board has
exercised its discretion to give written decisions in these areas, the
three cases assume some importance.
In Usen Fisheries, MacIntyre had been dismissed by the
company. He alleged that the reason for his dismissal was his
membership and activities in the Canadian Food and Allied Workers
Union. There were two issues before the Board. Firstly, the
company alleged the Board had no jurisdiction to hear the complaint
because the company operated out of Prince Edward Island and the
complainant normally resided in that province. Second, there was
the expected problem of interpreting the unfair labour practice
provisions of the Act and ascertaining the company's motive. The
Board held that it had jurisdiction and found the employer had
breached sections 51 (3)(a)(i) and 51 (3)(a)(vi).
The jurisdictional question was swiftly disposed of. The Board
simply held that since the alleged act was committed in Nova
Scotia, it could hear the complaint. 7 This decision is not
exceptional. Residence clearly cannot be the determinative factor,
otherwise companies incorporated and carrying on business mainly
in another province but involving periodic visits to Nova Scotia,
such as in areas of fishing and transportation, could flout the Trade
Union Act with impunity. Perhaps more important, there would be
no guarantee that the Province of residence, in this case Prince
Edward Island, would assume jurisdiction if the Nova Scotia
tribunal did not. It might well feel that it had no power since the act
giving rise to the complaint took place outside its territorial limits.
Accordingly, the Nova Scotia Board decision makes good sense. It
also appears to accord with Ontario practice. In the Inter-Provincial
Paving Company 8 case, the Ontario Labour Relations Board was
4.
5.
6.
7.

L.R.B. No. 2319, dated October 15, 1976
L.R.B. No. 426C and supplement. See also L.R.B. No. 404C.
L.R.B.No.431C
L.R.B. No.2319at I

8. [1962] O.L.R.B. Rep. 375; 63 CLLC 16, 286. See also Labour Relations
Board of New Brunswick v. Eastern Bakers Ltd. and Local Union 76, Teamsters,

etc. (1960), 26 D.L.R. (2d) 332. at 339per Abbott J.
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asked to and did assume jurisdiction over workers who resided in
Qu6bec but were working in Ontario. While the case is
distinguishable in that the employees were continuously employed
and the application was for certification, the same principle of
jurisdiction was applied.
The Nova Scotia Board spent considerably more time on the
actual unfair labour practice. As stated, it was found that the
employer on the balance of probabilites had breached both sections
51(3)(a)(i) and 51(3)(a)(vi). The former section prohibits discrimination in employment because the employee was a member or is a
member of a trade-union; the latter prohibits discrimination because
the employee has exercised any right under the Act - in this case,
the right of every employee to be a member of a union and to
participate in its activities. More important, however, is the Board's
discussion of the question of onus of proof.
Section 54(3) of the Nova Scotia Act provides for a reversal of
onus when an employee alleges an employer breach of s.51(3)(a).
One vital component of this section is that the "complainant
establishes that it is reasonable to believe that there may have been a
failure by the employer . . ." Thus the issue of what proof the

employee has to initially supply is vital. The Board took what we
feel is the logical interpretation of this clause in placing a relatively
light burden of proof on the employee:
In the opinion of the Board, section 54(3) imposes a very light
initial onus. It is not even necessary for the complainant to
establish that it is reasonable to believe that there was a failure by
the employer to comply with s.51(3)(a). He need only establish
that it is "reasonable to believe that there may have been" a
failure on the part of the employer to comply with section
51(3)(a).9
This interpretation is correct in terms of the section and common
sense. Were a tougher onus imposed, the employee would be in the
same position as if there were no statutory reversal. The employer
has in his possession all details of the dismissal and a record of the
employee, so that he is in a stronger position to argue the case and
should be expected to bear the heavier burden.
The Board then considered the question of employer motivation.
It pointed out that due to the inclusion of the word because in
section 51(3)(a), the question of motive is a vital component of
employer unfair labour practices. It then stated as follows:
9. L.R.B. No.2319at2
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Where the onus has shifted, unless the employer is able to satisfy
the Board that on the balance of probabilities the Complainant's
union membership or activities was not a significantfactor in the
refusal to employ or continue to employ him, the Board must find
that the Unfair Labour Practice is established. '0
In the writers' view, this seems a typical reaction to the problem of
motivation with one exception. We are mildly concerned about the
use of the word significant which seems to suggest some idea of
importance. Thus, one might compare its use to the terms used by
the Canada Labour Relations Board in R. v. Bushnell Cominunications Limited, "cited by the Nova Scotia Board, where it is said:
If the evidence satisfies it beyond reasonable doubt that
membership in a trade union was present to the mind of the
employer in his decision to dismiss, either as the main reason or
one incidental to it, or as one of many reasons regardless of

priority...

12

We feel that the Canada Labour Relations Board description of the
13
onus is marginally more liberal than the Nova Scotian wording.
The dictionary defines significant as "having or likely to have
influence or effect", but the use of that word would nevertheless
seem unfortunate because its everyday connotation to employees
may suggest something more substantial than the dictionary
meaning. There can be no doubt that this places a substantial onus
on the employer which, particularly in the context of certification
applications, organization and strikes, may be difficult to rebut. As
10. Id. at 3
1I. (1973),45D.L.R. (3d)218

12. Id. at 223per Hughs J.
13. Reference might also be made to the recent Ontario Labour Relations Board
decision in United Garment Workers v. Four B Manufacturing Ltd. (Ontario

Labour Relations Board, 1976- 1162-76-U):
The Board appreciates that the Legislature, in introducing the reverse onus
provisions into the Act, has entrusted us with the discharge of a difficult
responsibility. Nevertheless, in executing that responsibility the Board
recognizes that the Legislature intended that an industrial relations reality,
however unfortunate, be accepted. That is to say, implicit in the course of a
trade union's organizational campaign, any prejudicial act taken against
affected employees must be justified by a credible explanation free of an
anti-union motive. (See: The Barrie Examner case, [1975] OLRB Rep. 745 at
749.) Failure by the employer to satisfy that onus, notwithstanding the existence
of an ostensibly legitimate reason for the alleged wrongdoing, will result in a
positive finding of the committal of an unfair labour practice. We are of the
view that underlying these requirements is the premise that only the employer
knows the real reason for the acts taken to the employees' prejudice.
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stated above, however, we feel that this flows naturally from the
employer's preferential position and so long as he can provide
plausible justification such as work record or economic considerations, he has nothing to fear from the Board.
One final point in the decision is the remedy or lack thereof
provided by the Board. Rather than exercise their power under
section 55(a) and order reinstatement and compensation, it appears
to have left the parties to come to an agreement, subject to the right
to come back to the Board. 14 We do not know if this is the practice
of the Nova Scotia Board; perhaps it is preferable from an industrial
relations point of view to allow the parties to come to their own
arrangement. One wonders, however, how useful the right to return
to the Board would be when Usen Fisheries Ltd. had left Halifax
and was outside the Board's effective jurisdiction.
The two union unfair labour practice cases, McCulloch and
Crowell, both arose out of the construction industry and were
decided by the Construction Industry Panel. They both concerned
the hiring hall system, whereby unions are responsible for providing
the work force for the employer. Since to some extent the unions
control the "right to work", any abuse of their position may have
disastrous consequences for the individuals concerned.
In the McCulloch15 case, the complainant alleged that he was
being refused a "temporary permit" in the International Union of
Elevator Operators because in July, 1976, he had given testimony in
a hearing before the Panel which preceded the issuance of a Cease
and Desist Order against the union and its business representative,
Thomas Orman. More particularly, he alleged breaches by the
union of sections 52(f), (g), (h), and (i). He also complained that the
employer was guilty of a breach of section 51 (3)(a)(iii).
Section 51 (3)(a)(iii) provides that:
(3) No employer and no person acting on behalf of an employer
shall
(a) refuse to employ or to continue to employ any person or
otherwise discriminate against any person in regard to
employment of any term or condition of employment, because
the person
(iii) has testified or otherwise participated or may testify or
otherwise participate in a proceeding under this Act.
14. L.R.B. No.2319at 1
15. L.R.B. No.426C Supplement

Labour Law 397

McCullough alleged that the Union and Orman had discriminated
against him in breach of the section and that in doing so, they were
acting "on behalf of the employer" in the sense that they were
acting as the employer's agent for hiring under the pre-entry closed
shop provisions of their collective agreement. The Panel disposed of
this claim quickly. It found that insufficient evidence had been
adduced by the complainant to even shift the burden of proof under
section 54(3).
In some respects this decision by the Panel is disappointing. Their
finding was that "we were unable to conclude even that 'there may
have been a failure' by the employer or a person acting on his
behalf . . .-16 This implicitly rejects the complainant's agency
argument, but unfortunately the Panel did not deem to specify why.
At first sight, the agency argument does have some literal
attractiveness. The union is responsible for hiring and delivering all
workers; therefore, it can be argued that an agency relationship has
been created and that the union was acting "on behalf of" the
employer. However, this initial response may be too broad. Is it
possible, for example, to conclude that while the union has a
general agency responsibility, on occasions when it flagrantly
breaches the unfair labour practice provisions of the Act it is off on
a frolic of its own? Alternatively, it may well be argued that the
agency relationship, if in existence, is not wide enough to fit within
section 51(3)(a)(iii). Thus the section operates where there is
discrimination with respect to the employment of individuals. Under
the typical hiring hall situation, does the union have the right to
employ on behalf of the employer or only control the availability of
persons? In other words, does the employer have any residual rights
or control over whom he employs? If he does, it is suggested that
the union's agency would not in all likelihood extend to the
employment relationship. Furthermore, while the union does have
an obligation to supply labour arising out of the collective
agreement, there is considerable doubt whether an agency
relationship is created. If an employment agency is hired to supply
labour, they have contractual obligations but certainly no agency
relationship is created. If one construes agency as an arrangement
enabling the agent to affect the legal status of the principal, then
quite clearly this is correct. Thus, in a contractual sense the union
would never be acting "on behalf of the employer" within section
16. Id. at2
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51(1). It is its own principal, performing its own contractual
obligations and is acting on its own behalf and no one else's. Far
more important, however, would be the impact of a successful
agency argument from an industrial relations viewpoint. If the
complainant's argument were upheld, it would produce disastrous
results in the construction industry since as a result of the hiring hall
arrangement, the employer would be responsible for every illegal
act committed by the union. Clearly, this could not have been the
intention of the legislation which was quite apparently designed to
cover persons working directly under the auspices of the employer
and those over whom the employer had some control. To this
extent, then, the Panel's refusal to accept the complainant's
argument and refusal to follow a possible literal interpretation of
section 51(3)(a)(iii) makes good industrial relations sense. One
wishes, however, it had given rather fuller reasons for its decision.
The allegation of union unfair labour practices took the Panel
considerably longer to dispose of. The first problem was whether
the Panel had jurisdiction to hear the complaints under section 52.
Three of the four complaints involved allegations of improper denial
of, or suspension, or explusion from membership in the trade union.
McCulloch had never been refused full membership in the union but
had been refused a temporary permit which was a status given to
employees in the elevator industry until the union saw fit to give
them full membership. This permit constituted the basis of his
"right to work" in the industry in accordance with the closed shop
provision of the collective agreement and had been used by the
union for many years. Unfortunately, neither the union's
constitution nor by-laws mentioned the concept of temporary
permits. However, the collective agreement used the word
"permit" and the Panel wisely held that if the sections of the Trade
Union Act were to be given any effect, the term membership in
section 52 had to be read as including the status of holding a
temporary work permit.17 Clearly, as the Panel stated, the intent of
the Act could not be frustrated "by a device internal to the
union". 18

The second problem was the timeliness of the complainant's
action under section 53(2) of the Act, which provides that:
Subject to this Section, a complaint shall be made to the Board
17. Id. at 2
18. Id. at4
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pursuant to subsection (1) not later than ninety days from the date
on which the complainant knew, or in the opinion of the Board
ought to have known, of the action or circumstances giving rise
to the complaint.
The union and Thomas Orman objected that the complaints were
untimely so that the Panel had no jurisdiction. McCulloch had three
counter arguments. First, he alleged that the complaints were
against continuing offences i.e., every time he was refused a work
permit, a new offence was committed. Second, it was claimed that
McCulloch was not in a postion where he "knew" or "ought to
have known" of the circumstances giving rise to the complaint until
November, which would have placed him within the ninety-day
period. Third, it was argued that these complaints fell within section
54(3) and were thus outside the time limitations in section 53(2).
The Panel upheld the second of McCulloch's three points. They
found that it was not until November that McCulloch learned from
Orman the reason for his being refused admission and that up until
that time he had no solid basis for making the complaint. Thus, the
time limits did not apply.
The Panel also commented on the complainant's other two
arguments. As to the first point, it was found that the complaint
alleged was not of a continuing nature. The Panel concluded that
while McCulloch was refused admission every time he went to the
union, each refusal was the same as the earlier ones. In other words,
the union only committed the one offence in that no new element or
reason arose on the occasions when McCulloch kept re-applying. ' 9
This finding by the Panel is extremely important. The question of
continuing offences has always been problematic, particularly in the
arbitration area and the issue is made more difficult by the fact that
there are conflicting industrial relations considerations. On the one
hand, there must be some control over matters coming before the
Panel or Labour Relations Board. If one were to give a wide
interpretation to "continuing offences", the Board might be
flooded with complaints. Thus, if X was refused entry into a union
in July and found out ninety-five days later that he might have a
case, he could go to the union again, be refused again on the same
basis and start the action on the basis of a continuing offence. Even
in bona fide situations, to allow explusions to constitute a
continuing offence would be to render section 53(2) useless in that
19. Id. at 5
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area. On the other hand, there is no guarantee that individuals will
have the sense to seek advice when they are discriminated against in
some way. Should these people be thrown out by the Panel simply
because they were insufficiently sophisticated to go to a lawyer?
However, the decision seems to be technically correct. It appears
to be generally in line with the very brief comments by the Canada
Labour Relations Board in Sheehan v. Upper Lakes Shipping Co.
and C.B.R.T., C.M.U., Local 401. 2 0 Moreover, it would seem
consistent with the many arbitration decisions in the area.21 These
appear to draw a distinction between breaches of a collective
agreement which are part of an on-going obligation and breaches
which amount to single violations which have continuing
consequences. 2 2 Certainly, the breach of a union unfair labour
practice falls within the latter category, which does not constitute a
continuing offence.
The writers feel that the Board or Panel should have some
flexibility in order to entitle them to hear deserving cases which are
submitted bona fide but for some reasons fall outside the time
limits. The Panel has decided that a failure to satisfy the
requirements of section 52(3) is not merely a technical deficiency
24
within section 7;23 nor is the former section merely "directory".
Accordingly, it might be appropriate to consider the enactment of a
provision similar to s. 118(m) of the Canada Labour Code 2 5 which
permits the extension of the time limits in appropriate situations.
The decision in McCulloch may not necessarily be the last word
on continuing offences. We are not certain that repeated breaches of
unfair labour provisions will never amount to a continuing offence,
or at least give rise to a new offence on each occasion. Suppose that
Mr. McCulloch had been refused in July and had bona fide gone
20. [1976] 2 C.L.R.B. Rep. 187 at 192 [Since quashed by the Federal Court of
Canada. See Sheehan v. Upper Lakes Shipping and L.B.B. (Can.) (1977), 77
CLLC para. 14, III]
21. See generally, Brown & Beatty, Canadian Labour Arbitration (Toronto:
Canada Law Book Company, 1977) at 2.3128
22. See generally, M. Steinberg, Through Dominion Glass Darkly, Judicial
Review and The Clarificationof the Law (1976), 24 Chitty's L.J. 269
23. See Crowell, post.
24. Id.
25. R.S.C. 1970, c.L-I, s.118 (1) (m): "The Board has, in relation to any
proceeding before it, power ... to abridge or enlarge the time for instituting the
proceeding or for doing any act, filing any document or presenting any evidence in
connection with the proceeding." See also, Trade Union and Labour Relations
Act, 1974 (U.K.) para. 21(4).
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back again in October. We tentatively feel that if there was any
reason for McCulloch to believe that circumstances had changed,
e.g., union practice had altered, this new element might make the
union's second refusal a new offence. This point remains to be
considered.
The final point considered by the Panel in the context of time
limits was the impact of section 53(4) which provides:
(4) The Board may, on application to it by a complainant, hear a
complaint in respect of an alleged failure by a trade union to
comply with Section 52(f) or (g) that has not been presented as a
grievance or appeal to the trade union, if the Board is satisfied
that
(a) the action or circumstance giving rise to the complaint is
such that the complaint should be dealt with without delay;
or
(b) the trade union has not given the complainant ready access
to a grievance or appeal procedure.
The complainant argued that breaches of sections 52(f) and (g) were
involved here and that since section 53(4) contained no express time
limitations, the ninety-day period did not apply. The Panel found
that in the absence of words to the contrary, the section was subject
to the time limitation. 26
Once again the Panel decision is disappointingly brief and some
editorial comment might be in order. We cannot fault the Panel's
concern that it not be flooded with complaints that would otherwise
be out of time. However, restraints could easily have been put on
the section by the doctrine of laches which would have given the
Panel the flexibility they lacked under section 52(3).
One other minor point of concern with the Panel decision
involves the situation where section 53(3) is involved. This section
provides that any breach of section 52(f) or 52(g) must first be
submitted to the union grievance procedure. Only if the conditions
in section 53(4) are satisfied, will the Panel hear the matter without
that procedure being followed. Suppose Mr. McCulloch had
presented the matter to the union in accordance with section 53(3).
The union sits on the matter for ninety days and refuses to do
anything. McCulloch then goes to the Panel under section 53(4)(b).
Does the Panel have any jurisdiction to hear the alleged complaint
because the self-imposed ninety-day restraint period applies?
26. L.R.B. 426C at 5
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This situation may pose a difficult matter of interpretation for the
Panel. If the complaint is made under section 53(4) it would appear
that the ninety-day period had elapsed and that it had no
jurisdiction. Clearly, this would be an unfortunate result. On the
other hand, it might be more satisfactory to alter the basis of the
complaint and proceed under section 53(3) (b). This gives the Panel
jurisdiction where a complaint has been made under the union
grievance procedure and the union "has dealt with the grievance or
appeal of the complainant in a manner unsatisfactory to him". The
difficult question for the Panel to decide is whether section 53(3)
applies at all. Has the union been seized of the matter simply by the
reference? Have they dealt with the matter by doing nothing so as to
bring section 53(3)(b) into operation? One would hope that the
Panel would decide this question affirmatively. If not we may
have a situation of a bona fide complainant having no standing
before the tribunal, which is certainly not what the Act intended.
The heart of the Panel's decision was the complainant's
allegation that the union had breached sections 52(f)(g)(h)(i). The
Panel found that both section 52(f) and (i)(1) of the Act had been
breached. The union had discriminated against McCulloch because
in July, 1976, he had given testimony in a hearing before the Panel
preceding the issuance of a cease and desist order. Mr. Orman, the
union business representative, offered an explanation of the union
27
activities but the Panel simply did not believe him.
The Panel, however, did not find a breach of either section 5 2 (g)
or (h). It concluded that there was no evidence that the union had
taken any action against the complainant "by reason of his having
refused to perform an act that is contrary to the Act" within section
52(h). 28 More importantly, the Panel found that section 5 2 (g) did
not apply because it contains the words "disciplinary action" and
"penalty"
and denial of, or explusion or suspension from
membership in a trade union did not fit within those terms. The
rationale for the Panel's decision was that to accept the
complainant's argument would be to render redundant section 52(f)
29
which specifically dealt with those matters.
This decision by the Panel as to what constitutes "disciplinary
action" or "a penalty" assumes great importance when the
27. Id. at 2
28. Id. at 3

29. Id.
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question of remedies arises. In the McCulloch case, the Panel
exercised its power under section 55(c) and ordered the union and
Thomas Orman to cease their discrimination against the complainant and issue him a temporary work permit in accordance with the
generally applicable working rules of the union. 3 0 However, it
refused to award compensation to the complainant for time off
work. Section 55(d), the section which authorizes compensation,
states that the Panel may order the union:
to pay compensation . . . not exceeding such sum as, in the

opinion of the Board, is equivalent to any pecuniary or other
penalty imposed on the employee by the trade union.
The Panel did not discuss the question of whether Mr. McCulloch
was an employee within section 55(d). Presumably they found that
he was. It was decided, however, that consistent with the
interpretation given to sections 55(g) and (h), the denial of or
suspension of expulsion from membership in a trade union was not a
penalty.
In industrial relations terms this is a disastrous decision. In the
hiring hall situation, common to the construction trades, the union
has almost complete control over whether or not employment is
available. When a union utilizes that sort of power against an
individual, it does seem somewhat strange to say that a refusal does
not constitute a form of penalty. In the sense of finding a breach of
the Act, this does not pose many problems; section 55(f) will
normally catch the union. But when, as a result of this
interpretation, no monetary compensation can be provided for
someone kept off work for three months, the consequences are very
serious.
It is frustrating that the Panel's decision is probably a correct
intepretation of the Act. It can be argued with some force that
membership connections with the union are dealt with by section
52(f) and the corresponding remedy of reinstatement is provided in
section 55(c). Disciplinary action and penalties, i.e., internal fines
and similar action are dealt with in section 52 (g) and the remedy of
compensation in section 55(d). Moreover, when one reads section
55(d) one is struck by the terminology. It talks in terms of penalties.
If one compares this with section 55(a)(ii) which talks in terms of
compensation for lost remuneration, the basis for the panel's
narrow interpretation of section 55(d) becomes apparent.
30. Id. at 5
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This interpretation does not mean that the Panel's decision is
desirable. Indeed, its concern with the niceties of statutory
interpretation is rather strange, compared to its recognizing
industrial relations realities as the basis for its decisions in the
Schwartz3 ' series of cases. One would have thought that this is one
occasion when some linguistic flexibility would have been justified.
Of greater concern, however, is the present situation. The Panel has
subsequently run into trouble with section 55(d) 32 and something
must be done.
It is difficult to know why the statute was written as it was. The unfair
labour practices were largely lifted straight from the Canada Labour
Code which still contains the same provisions. 3 3 What is uncertain is
whether the omission was intentional - it may, for example, be a
conscious decision on the part of the legislature to restrict their
supervision of unions to fines, etc. imposed and not to open it up to
potentially large awards of damages. Alternatively, it may just be a
very large gap in the Act. In the writers' view, either alternative is
equally bad and the matter should be remedied at once.
34
The second of the union unfair labour practice cases, the Crowel1
case, also involved the International Union of Elevator Operators and
Thomas Orman. In this case the complainant, Crowell, was the victim
of a nationwide dispute between the Elevator Operators and Dover
Corporation. The Complainant was qualified as a "helper" under the
terms of the collective agreement but had been working for some time
as a "temporary mechanic". The union had, however, refused the
complainant the right to work in the latter capacity as part of an
on-going dispute it was having with Dover Corporation. Subsequently, Crowell was refused work even as a "helper".
The problem continued for some time. Crowell sought special
permission from the union to get his status as "temporary mechanic";
he was refused. He worked as "temporary mechanic" without union
permission but stopped after receiving a letter threatening disciplinary
action. Later he went back to work without union permission on
maintenance matters and he was blacklisted by union members.
Company supervisory staff were used to back him upon his
maintenance route. Eventually, as a result of contraction in
3 1. See Hansen et al, Recent Developments in LabourLaw in Nova Scotia, (1976)
2 DaI.L.J. 791 at 803- 8 19
32. See Crowell, post.
33. R.S.C. 1970, c.L-I, ss. 185 (f)(g)
34. L.R.B. No.431C
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employment opportunities, Crowell was relegated to the status of
"helper", again in accordance with the collective agreement. By this
time, he had been expelled from the union and since by the collective
agreement he could not work alone as a "helper", Dover terminated
his position as no union man would work with him.
The Panel found that the union by October 23rd had expelled
Crowell from the Union for reasons other than a failure to pay periodic
dues, assessments or initiation fees. In fact, it was concluded he had
been expelled because he had worked as a "temporary mechanic"
without union permission. Similarly, the Panel found that Dover
Corporation had terminated the complainant's employment because of
the actions of Thomas Orman on behalf of the union in directing other
members not to work with him.
The first major issue faced by the Panel was once again the issue of
timeliness under section 53(2). As indicated supra, the Panel found
that section 53(2) was not a mere technical objection within section'
36 The arguments dealt with in
7,35 nor was it directory in nature.
McCulloch were raised again but were rejected by the Panel for the
same reasons as in the earlier case. It was concluded, however, that two
specific complaints were timely. 3 7 The company termination of
employment was alleged to be an offence within section 51(3) (a) (ii)
and the corresponding union action of encouraging the employer to
terminate was stated to be within section 52(e). Both of these actions
really only took effect on February 14th; this was the earliest the
complainant could have known of them and thus they were within the
ninety-day limitation period.
Sections 52(e) and 51(3) (a) (ii) are very similar. Section 52(e)
provides that:
52. No trade union and no person acting on behalf of a trade union shall
(e) require an employer to terminate the employment of an
employee because he has been expelled or suspended from
membership in the trade union fora reason other than a failure
to pay the periodic dues, assessments and initiation fees
uniformly required to be paid by all members of the trade union
as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership in the
trade union;
Similarly, section 51(3)(a)(ii) states that:

35. Id. at 4
36. Id.
37. Id.
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(3) No employer and no person acting on behalf of an employer
shall
(a) refuse to employ or to continue to employ any person or
otherwise discriminate against any person in regard to
employment or any term or condition of employment,
because the person
(ii) has been expelled or suspended from membership in a
trade union for a reason other than a failure to pay the
periodic dues, assessments and initiation fees
uniformly required to be paid by all members of the
trade union as a condition of acquiring or retaining
membership in the trade union.
The Panel had no difficulty concluding that the union had required
Dover Corporation to terminate their relationship with Crowell for
reasons other than non-payment of dues. There was a clear breach of
section 52(e). The Panel also concluded that the Company had
breached section 51 (3)(a)(ii). It was submitted by Dover Corporation
that it did not terminate because of Crowell's explusion from the union
but because no one would work with him. Clearly, this defence is
untenable. As the Panel said, to accept this argument would be to
render section 51(3)(a)(ii) inapplicable on most occasions. 38 For
example, if the union went on strike rather than simply not work with
the individual, the employer could acquiesce and the complainant
would have no remedy. The employer, the Panel stated categorically,
could not acquiesce in such union conduct. 3
These factual findings by the Panel represent a logical response to
the fairly extreme facts of the case. When the question of remedies
arose, however, the Panel ran into the problem that, as in the
McCulloch case, they could not award compensation because there
was no disciplinary action or penalty imposed within the
40
terminology of section 55(d).
38. Id. at 5
39. This contrasts to some extent with the position under unfair dismissal
legislation in Britain where tribunals, in exercising their discretion whether to order
reinstatement or re-engagement for an unfair dismissal, generally refuse to make
such orders where the effect would be to exacerbate relations with the union and
create industrial strife. Eg., Coleman v. Magnet Joinery Ltd., [1974] I.R.C. 25
(N.I.R.C.) approved [1975] I.C.R.46 (C.A.); Pringle v.

Lucas Industrial

Equipment Ltd., [1975] I.R.L.R. 266 (Liverpool Industrial Tribunal); Bateman v.
British Levland Ltd., [1974] I.C.R.403 (N.E.R.C.); Coleman v. Toleinans
Delivery Service Ltd. (1973), 8 I.T.R.56 (Liverpool Industrial Tribunal).

40. L.R.B.No.431Cat6
41. Id.
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The writers have no qualms about the Panel ordering Dover
Corporation to pay the full compensation. In the circumstances it
was the only way that the complainant could be compensated and it
was made very clear that, had the Panel had the power, the union
would have had to share the cost. 4 1 Moreover, Dover Corporation,
as the party in a position to refuse the union approach, was
substantially at fault. The company knew why Crowell had been
expelled from the union; it made no attempt to discipline employees
refusing to work with the complainant and made no attempt to
protect Crowell by refering the matter in dispute to arbitration. In
short, the company completely acquiesced in the union's argument.
This does not, however, alter the position that the present legislation
does have a large gap and should be remedied as soon as possible.
One final case involving an unfair labour practice allegation
before the Labour Relations Board was the Sydney Police
Commission case. 4 2 In this case, the watchmen working for the
Sydney Council, members of the Sydney Civic Workers, were
engaged in a lawful strike. Following a series of events, Sydney
policemen were required to supervise various warehouses where the
watchmen were normally employed. Initially, the police officers
remained in the warehouse. Subsequently, however, they supervised the warehouse from outside a picket line set up by the striking
watchmen, crossing the line only to phone in to headquarters. The
policemen were members of CUPE, Local 758 and eventually at a
meeting of the union, it was decided that no member would
thereafter cross the picket line. A short time later the City Police
Chief ordered the members to enter the warehouse and do police
duty. When the police officers refused, all of them, fifty-eight in
number, were suspended with a recommendation for dismissal.
CUPE alleged that the Police Chief had breached section
51(3)(c); the first time such a complaint had been made under that
section since 1972. It reads:
3. No employer and no person acting on behalf of an employer
shall
(c) suspend, discharge or impose any financial or other penalty
on an employee or take any other disciplinary action against
an employee, by reason of his refusal to perform all or some
of the duties and responsibilities of another employee who
is participating in a strike that is not prohibited by this Act.
42. L.R.B. No. 2348, dated February 4, 1977
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The issue then for the Board was whether the policemen had been
suspended by reason of their refusal to perform some of the duties of
the striking watchmen. The Board in fact found that the policemen
were not asked to perform any aspect of the watchmen's duties.
While there was a strong similarity between their employment
obligations, ultimately the Board decided that the police obligation
was to provide 'police protection' which was significantly different
43
from the watchmen's duties of safekeeping and security.
There is nothing surprising about the decision on the facts. While
we have some difficulty in seeing how the policemen's duty was not
also "safekeeping and security" in the present case, in at least some
respects, the Board reached the conclusion that there was a
difference between watchmen and police protection after two and a
half days of hearing and that finding must be accepted. What is
important is the dicta of the Board as to general applicability of their
decision. The Board made it perfectly clear that normally an
employee whose regular duties overlapped the duties of an
employee on strike would be protected by section 51(3)(c). 44 So
presumably, would an employee who normally did completely
different work but was asked to perform some aspect of a striking
employee's work. The decision in the present case was simply that
the police protection was not the same as any aspect of the
watchmen's duties. The Board has, therefore, left the way open for
section 51 (3)(c) to be applied in appropriate situations in the future.
Certification
Not unnaturally, during the past eighteen months, problems with the
certification process have once again been the dominant feature of
the industrial relations arena in Nova Scotia. There has fortunately
not been a recurrence of the battles in the Schwartz case and
subsequent authorities discussed in the last Recent Developments
Issue although the Labour Relations Board Policy Statement on
Pre-hearing Votes, brought in largely as a result of the Schwartz
decision has been sucessfully challenged in the Little Narrows
Gypsum 45 decision. More important, however, are the changes in
legislation recently introduced to clarify the whole certification
process and which promise to make it somewhat more peaceful in
43. Id. at 3
44. Id.
45. S.H. No. 12787, dated February 1, 1977
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the future. Aside from these developments, the only decision
worthy of note is the Texaco Canada46 case where the Board had
cause to consider the constitution of the union involved.
In the Texaco Canada Ltd4 7 case, the Atlantic Oil Workers had
filed for certification of a group of employees in the refining
department of the company. The union at the time of application
had as "members" more than the requisite forty percent.
Nevertheless, the Board rejected the application on the basis that the
union had less than 40% of the unit as "members in good
standing".
The Board's reasoning is extremely important. The union
involved was a new union. Its basis for support was local and it had
no international or national parent. More important, because of its
new existence, it had only recently adopted a constitution. The
Board simply held that of those people who had signed membership
cards, only those who had signed after the founding meeting and
adoption of the constitution were "members in good standing"
within Regulation 10. Those who took "membership" prior to the
adoption of the constitution and who had not subsequently affirmed
their membership could not be so classified.
Clearly, the Board decision is correct. Regulation 10 pursuant to
the Trade Union Act defines who is a "member in good standing".
But, as the Board said, one cannot be a member of an organization
which does not exist at the time of joining. Aside from this technical
rationale, however, there is a sound industrial relations basis for this
conclusion. At the time of application for certification, a union must
file its constitution - it is extremely important that members of that
union in fact know or have the opportunity to know what that
constitution says at the time they join. Otherwise, the union might
obtain 80% of the unit as members, then adopt a constitution to
which 40% of the members might have substantial objections. At
this stage, however, it might be too late to withdraw their
membership or make any practical objection.
This decision is not particularly novel. It accords with practice
elsewhere. 4 8 Nevertheless, it is important in the sense that the
46. L.R.B. No. 2340
47. Id.
48. Reference should be made to the several Ontario cases dealing with the proper
methods of forming new unions and the importance of having a formally adopted
constitution. See Canadian Brotherhood of Welders & Burnersv. J. Harris & Sons
Ltd., [1960] CLLC 16,177; Drummond Transit Company, [1959] O.L.R.B.
Rep.31 and Cochrane-DunlopHardware, [1963] CLLC 16,268, where improperly
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Board is making an attempt to ensure that at least basic democratic
rights are sustained in new unions. To this extent, it provides for
such organizations a clear indication of Board practice and sound
advice as to how they should proceed in their organization
programme. Every new union must be formed with a constitution
and then it can begin signing up members. This should be compared
with new locals of already existing unions. 49 Here the parent
organization will have existing constitutional documents to which
the new members can make reference at the time they join. Of
course there is the possibility that the local constitution will differ
from the parent's, but since to our knowledge the adoption of the
standard constitution by the local is compulsory, this does not
represent a great practical danger. New unions and their legal
representatives should, therefore, take careful note of the decision.
A recurring problem in certification is the method of vote-taking.
It will be remembered that following the problems caused by the
Schwartz decision, the Board introduced its policy of pre-hearing
votes. 50 This was not done by regulation by Order-in-Council, but
pursuant to the Board's power to make rules under section 17(a).
There is little sense in restating the procedure. 5 ' Suffice it to say
that a pre-hearing vote was taken in practically all cases within a
few days of the application for certification. Any petitions, etc.
pursuant to the regulations, had to be filed as usual, but their
incidence dropped considerably due to the short time available in
which to organize them. Finally, the Board treated the pre-hearing
vote in an identical fashion to the manner in which it had previously
acted with the traditional voting procedure. If it certified without a
vote, the pre-hearing votes were destroyed. If it ordered a vote, the
vote previously taken was counted. This procedure continued on a
satisfactory basis for approximately eighteen months. However, not
surprisingly, someone decided to challenge the new procedure.
In Little Narrows Gypsum Company Ltd. v. Labour Relations
Board and International Union of Operating Engineers, Local
721B, 52 an application in the nature of certiorariwas made to quash
constituted organizations were denied status as a trade union under the Ontario Act.
49. Island ParkFoodMart Ltd., Re Goldstein I.G.A., [1970] O.L.R.B. Rep. 838;
Cochrane-DunlopHardware,supra
50. Policy Statement of the Nova Scotia Labour Relations Board, June 1975
51. See the excellent brief outline of the policy in Christie, Certification - Is
There a Better Way to Test Employee Wishes (McGill Conference on Industrial
Relations, May 1977)
52. S.H. No. 12787
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a decision of the Board in which the'pre-hearing vote procedure had
been utilized. The procedure adopted by the Board in the case was
not exceptional. 53 The application was made, a pre-hearing vote
ordered, five interventions and twelve petitions were received by
the Board and subsequent to a hearing the Board ordered the
pre-hearing votes to be counted. The result was that, of 64 eligible
voters, 41 had cast ballots - 22 had voted for the union and 19
against. Accordingly, despite the fact that this did not constitute
majority support for the union, the Board certified it in accord with
section 24(3).
The company's argument in the application for certiorari was
twofold: 54 firstly, that the Board lacked jurisdiction to conduct the
pre-hearing vote and it was therefore a nullity and should not have
been relied on in the certification application. Secondly, that even if
the pre-hearing vote procedure was valid and within the Board's
power, it was improper in that it did not give the company sufficient
time to exercise its rights to express its views to the employees and
that the Notice of Election furnished by the Board did not properly
inform employees of the purpose of effect of the vote. Therefore,
the Board should not have exercised its discretion to certify a union
for which less than 50% had voted.
On the vital first point, Cowan C.J. held that the pre-hearing vote
procedure was outside the power of the Board. His Lordship
concluded that the only jurisdiction the Board had to order a vote
was under section 24 and that before that vote could be ordered, the
Board, by virtue of section 2 of the 1973 regulations, and section
24(2) itself, had to consider petition evidence, the dimensions of the
appropriate unit and the percentage of the members in good
standing. Since under the pre-hearing vote procedure the vote was
55
taken at an earlier stage, the vote was ultra vires the Board.
In my opinion, the Board had no jurisdiction to order a
pre-hearing vote of the kind held in this case. The only vote of
employees which the Board is empowered to order is that
contemplated by s.24(2) of the Act and, as indicated above, the
Board may, under the Act and the regulations, including the
regulation of 1973, order such a vote only after taking the
procedural steps in making the determination of the dimensions
of the appropriate unit, and of the number of members of the
53. L.R.B. No. 2336
54. S.H. No. 12787 at2

55. Id. at 17
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appropriate unit who are members in good standing of the
applicant union. These procedural steps were not taken, in the
present instance by the Board. In certifying the union as
bargaining agent, in the order which is attached, the Board
purported to act under the provisions of s.24(3) of the Act. The
Board made a finding that a vote of the employees in the unit had
been taken under its direction, that not less than 60% of the
employees in the unit had voted, and that a majority of those
voting had selected the trade union to be a bargaining agent on
their behalf.
In my opinion, the pre-hearing vote is not "a vote of the
employees in the unit . . . taken under the direction of the
Board", as authorized by the Act and the regulations. In my
opinion, express statutory authority
is required for the holding of
6
a pre-hearing vote of employees. 5
It is difficult to fault the reasoning of the Court on this occasion.
The writers have always been of the view that the pre-hearing vote
procedure was of doubtful validity 57 and Cowan C.J.'s response is
quite justifiable. His Lordship was well aware of the policy
considerations behind the Board's introduction of the procedure,
although one might query the insight behind his response based on
legislative intention. 58 Cowan C. J. also considered, albeit briefly,
the main argument for the Board. Counsel pointed out that the
Board had followed appropriate procedure pursuant to section 17
and Regulation 6 in making rules governing its procedure in taking
votes under section 24. It was then submitted that the phrase "the
taking of a vote" in section 24(2) (c), referred to the complete
voting process, including the taking of the vote, the counting of the
ballots and determination of the result. In other words, the ordering
of the vote was not the vital point under section 24(2). It was the
giving effect to them under section 24 that was important and so long
as the Board determined the appropriate unit etc. before the vote
became determinative, this was perfectly consistent with the
56. Id. at 15-16
57. See (1976), 2 Dal.L.J. 791 at 812 n.98

58. At S.H. No. 12787 at 16 Cowan C. J. States essentially that since the
pre-hearing vote procedure was not included in the Act, it must have been the
intention of the legislature to contemplate "the lapse of some time between the
filing of the applications for certification and the holding of a vote under the
direction of the Board and after the preliminary steps had been followed." Our
view is not that the legislature intended this time lapse but that such a gap is quite
normal when the pre-hearing vote procedure is not used and in the Nova Scotia
situation it would appear the pre-hearing vote procedure was never seriously
considered.
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structure of the Act. In short, counsel was alleging that the vote
could not be said to be completely taken until the ballots were
counted. Cowan C.J. responded that in his opinion, the decisive
point was the casting of the ballots. Accordingly, his Lordship
concluded that the Board had no jurisdiction to conduct the vote in
the way it did and the pre-hearing vote procedure was struck
59
down.
Before moving on to the good news about the certification
process, two other points dealt with by Cowan C.J. should be
mentioned briefly. First, he quickly rejected the arguments of the
company based on natural justice.
If, contrary to my opinion, the Board had jurisdiction and
authority to order a pre-hearing vote, the manner of conducting
the vote would, in my view, be a matter of procedure for the
Board. The objections raised by the company to the form of
notice would have little merit if the time between the issuing of
the Notice of Election and the actual balloting had been more
than a few days. This would give the company and the union time
purpose and effect of the balloting
to explain to the employees the
60
and the effect of abstention.
Obviously, in the circumstances, this finding would give small
comfort to the Board but at least the method of the procedure, if not
the validity, survived.
Secondly, his Lordship correctly pointed out that there is an
apparent discrepancy between the phrase in the Notice of Election
given to employees which reads "THE BOARD MAY DISPOSE
OF THE APPLICATION WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE AND
WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE PETITION OF ANY PERSON
WHO FAILS TO ATTEND THE BOARD HEARING" 6 1 and
section 2(3) of the June 14, 1973 regulations. The latter did not
require that the person signing a petition should appear himself but
only that some witness should appear who could give evidence as to
the origin and manner of procurement of the petition.
One wonders why Cowan C.J. even raised this point.
Admittedly, the wording was in conflict but this had been clarified
with the Board. Moreover, it had not been the Board practice to give
effect to the terminology of the Notice of Election. To the writers'
knowledge, it had always followed the procedure under the 1973
59. S.H. No. 12787 at 17
60. Id. at 18
61. See Form 9 of the RegulationsPursuantto the Trade Union Act.
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regulations. At any rate, the point is now moot.
This brings us to the legislative amendments to the certification
provisions. Over the period in which the pre-hearing vote procedure
was being utilized by the Board, the Joint Labour-Management
Study Committee had been attempting to reach a consensus that
would put the procedure in legislative form and also make other
changes in the certification process. Eventually, the Committee
emerged with an agreement which was put before Cabinet and
finally received Royal Assent on May 19, 1977, with some changes
from the original draft. 62
62. Section 24 of Chapter 19 of the Acts of 1972, the Trade Union Act is amended
(a) by renumbering subsections (4), (6), (7) and (8) thereof respectively as
subsections (13), (14), (15) and (16); and
(b) by repealing subsections (1), (2), (3) and (5) thereof and substituting
therefor the following subsections:
24(1) Where a trade union makes application for certification in accordance
with Section 22 the Board shall take a vote of the employees in the unit applied
for to determine their wishes with respect to the certification of the applicant
trade union as their bargaining agent.
(2) The Board shall conduct the vote under subsection (1) at the place of
employment of the employees in the unit applied for during regular working
hours.
(3) Normally the Board shall conduct the vote under subsection (1) no more than
five working days after receipt by the Board of the application and three
working days after the Board's notices are received by the employer, but if, in
the opinion of the Board, special circumstances make it inappropriate to hold a
vote until the Board has made such investigations as it deems appropriate
including, if the Board so decides, giving interested parties an opportunity to
present evidence and make representations, the Board may delay the vote.
(4) The Board shall determine whether the unit applied for is appropriate for
collective bargaining and the Board may, before certification, if it deems it
appropriate to do so, include additional employees in or exclude employees
from the unit.
(5) Where a vote is counted the Board shall remove and destroy without
counting the ballots cast by persons not in the bargaining unit determined to be
appropriate.
(6) The Board shall take such steps as it deems appropriate to determine the
trade union membership of employees in the unit determined to be appropriate
for collective bargaining.
(7) When the Board has determined that a unit of employees is appropriate for
collective bargaining, if the Board is satisfied that at the date of the filing of the
application for certification the applicant trade union had as members in good
standing
(a) less than forty per centum of the employees in the unit the Board shall
dismiss the application; or
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There are several key aspects of the new legislation which
completely replaces section 24. First, as expected, the pre-hearing
vote is given legislative sanction. The procedure is similar to that
under the earlier Policy Statement with one exception. By section
24(3) the Board is given a discretion to delay the vote until "the
Board had made such investigations as it deems appropriate,
including, if the Board so decides, giving interested parties an
opportunity to present evidence and make representations." The

writers are not clear what situations this phrase is intended to cover.
Presumably it covers evidence and representations made to the
Board and not, for example, by the employer to the employees.
(b) forty per centum or more of the employees in the unit the Board shall,

subject to subsection (11), take and count the vote.
(8) Where as a result of a vote taken and counted pursuant to clause (b) of
subsection (7) the majority of the votes cast are in favour of the applicant trade
union, the Board shall, subject to subsection (11), certify the applicant trade
union as bargaining agent of the employees in the unit.
(9) Where, in the opinion of the Board, an employer or employer's organization
has contravened this Act or regulations made pursuant to this Act in so
significant a way that the representation vote does not reflect the true wishes of
the employees in the bargaining unit determined to be appropriate for collective
bargaining, and in the opinion of the Board the applicant trade union, at the date
of the filing of the application for certification, had as members in good
standing not less than forty per centum of the employees in the unit, the Board
may, in its discretion, certify the trade union as bargaining agent of the
employees in the unit.
(10) Where in the opinion of the Board the applicant trade union or a
representative of the trade union has contravened this Act or regulations made
pursuant to this Act in so significant a way that the representation vote does not
reflect the true wishes of the employees in the bargaining unit determined to be
appropriate for collective bargaining, the Board may, in its discretion, dismiss

the application.
(11) Where in the opinion of the Board the applicant trade union or a
representation of the trade union has contravened this Act or regulations made
pursuant to this Act so that the membership information filed with the
application does not represent the true wishes of the employees in the unit
determined to be appropriate for collective bargaining the Board may, in its
discretion, dismiss the application.
(12) The Board may prescribe the nature of the evidence to be furnished to it,
and the Board or any person to whom it may in writing delegate the authority
may, for the purpose of making any determination under this Section, Sections
22, 23, 26, 27, and 28, make or cause to be made any examination of records or
other inquiries, hold any hearings or take or supervise the taking and counting of
any votes that it deems expedient, and no person shall hinder or obstruct the
Board or any person so authorized in the exercise of the power conferred by this
Section.
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Accordingly, it appears likely that the delaying power of the Board
will be used where there are problems dealing with a roving
workforce, e.g., where the place of employment is undetermined;
questions relating to the opportunity to vote, e.g., a university at
which everyone is on holiday at the vital time; and possibly
preliminary questions relating to the determination of the
appropriate unit.
Secondly, the legislation effectively removes petitions from the
certification procedure, thus eliminating the main source of
problems for the Board in the last four years.
Thirdly, for all intents and purposes, the pre-hearing vote will be
counted on every occasion. By section 24(7), where the applicant
union has less than 40% of employees in- the unit as members in
good standing, the Board shall reject the application. Where there
are more than 40% members in good standing, a vote shall be held.
Provided a majority of the votes cast are in favour of the union, it
shall be certified by the Board. 63 The only two exceptions to this
compulsory procedure are where the union or the employer has
committed an unfair labour practice. 61 If the union has breached the
Act or regulations in so significant a way that the vote does not
reflect the true wishes of the employees, the Board may disregard
the vote and refuse to certify. 6 5 Similarly, where the union has
breached the Act or regulations so that the membership information
does not reflect the employees' true wishes, the Board may dismiss
66
the application without even ordering a vote.
Finally, the new legislation adopts the British Columbia and
Ontario approach of allowing the Board to certify a union with 40%
or more members in good standing where the employer has
committed an unfair labour practice which is so significant that the
67
vote does not represent the true wishes of the employees.
Employers are thus clearly warned not to interfere illegally in the
organizing campaign. If they do, not only will the vote possibly be
ignored but the union, which may have only minority support, will
likely be certified automatically.
In a rare instance of unanimity, both labour and management
seem fairly happy with the amendments. The unions, who have
63. Id. at 24(8)
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. "subject to subs. 10"
Id. at 24(10)
Id. at 24(11)
Id. at 24(9)
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been rather obsessed with the disadvantages of secret ballots, seem
to have been convinced that so long as the secret ballot is taken
quickly there will be no opportunity for possible employer
interference and that their support will not be eroded during the
three-month wait for a hearing. The employers seem content with
the notion that the vote will be counted on almost every occasion,
thus ensuring majority support for the Union. Moreover, there is no
indication that the system will not work. If the union has support at
the time of application, that support should be reflected in a vote
which is taken quickly. If the union loses when the vote is counted,
that is a clear indication that the union did not enjoy majority
support. The only exception to this general rule is where the
employer has illegally interfered and, as stated, the Board has the
appropriate remedy here.
This is not to say that the amendments are perfect. In the writers'
view, some problems may arise with both of the provisions dealing
with union and employer interference which affects the vote. The
requirement is that the party be found to have breached the Act or
regulations, which will mean in effect a full-scale hearing of an
unfair labour practice with all the problems of intent involved in
such offences. 68 Moreover, the breach must be made "in so
significant a way that the representation vote does not reflect" the
employees' true wishes. 69 These words are much narrower than
those in the Ontario Act where the phrase is "not likely to be
disclosed."' 70 We are somewhat concerned that if MacKeigan
C.J.'s frolics in the Schwartz case are indicative of the likely
approach of the Courts in this area, the Board may be in for more
trouble. It should be noted, however, that the Board is expressly
given the jurisdiction in this matter and this may curb any
undesirable judicial tendencies. 71
One final point that might be mentioned briefly is the compulsory
nature of certification under the amendments. It will be remembered
that under the old section 24(3)(c) the Board had a discretion as to
whether to certify. 72 This was used, inter alia, to prevent the
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. The Labour RelationsAct, R.S.O. 1970, c.232, s.7(4)
71. S.N.S. 1972, c. 19, s.24(9): "Where, in the opinion of the Board ......
72. See (1976), 2 Dal. L.J. 791 at 800-802. Also Nova Scotia Government
Employees Association and the Isaak Walton Killamn HospitalforChildren, L.R.B.
No. 2116
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certification of unions that had constitutional deficiencies in the
sense that they could not have jurisdiction over the employees or
possibly because they discriminated against employees in the unit.
Now that the act of certification is mandatory, one wonders where
the Board will get this discretion. The new section 24(11) requires
that the union breach the Act or regulations before the Board can
decide not to hold a vote and the Ontario High Court decision in the
CSAO 73 case and subsequent Ontario Board practice would seem to
indicate that a discriminatory union constitution is not necessarily a
breach of the Act. In other words, unless the union contravenes the
express discriminatory provisions in what is now section 24(15)74,
it may be beyond the reach of the Board. It will be interesting to see
how the Board deals with this question.
These few points aside, it is our view that the new amendments
should prove to be far superior to the former provisions. No doubt
difficulties will arise but the removal of petitions and the
legislative sanction given to pre-hearing votes should remove many
problems for the Board. It is interesting, when the tendency in other
provinces is to move away from the necessity of vote counting, that
Nova Scotia has chosen to go in the opposite direction. In our view,
the Nova Scotian approach would seem to make good sense.
Revocation of Certification
Applications for revocation of certification arise far less than
applications for certification. Accordingly, while section 27 of the
Nova Scotia Act is an extremely important section, the Board has
not had occasion to amplify its meaning until the recent Henwood
Foods Ltd. 75 case.
73. CSAO National and Oakville Trafalgar Memorial Hospital Association v.
Ontario Labour Relations Board, [1972] S.O.R. 609, 23 D.L.R. (3d) 649. See
also Maine Lumber Company and Carpenters and Joiners, Local 2679, [1973]

O.L.R.B. Rep. 40.
74. "Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, no trade union, the
administration, management, or policy of which is, in the opinion of the Board,
dominated or influenced by an employer, so that its fitness to represent employees
for the purpose of collective bargaining is impaired or which discriminates against
any person because of sex, race, creed, colour, nationality, ancestry or place of
origin, shall be certified as the bargaining agent of the employees, nor shall an
agreement entered into between that trade union and that employer be deemed to be
a collective agreement."
75. L.R.B. No. 2377, dated July 15, 1977. The Board's decision in this case has
subsequently been quashed in the Nova Scotia Supreme Court by Glube J. (S.H.
No. 16200, dated October 4, 1977). Her Ladyship found that "represents" in

LabourLaw 419

The respondent union, Retail, Wholesale and Department Store
Union, Local 1015, had been certified as bargaining agent for "all
employees" of the predecessqr of the employer. At that stage the
practice of the Board was to certify only full-time employees and
all collective bargaining had been conducted on a similar basis in
subsequent years. In other words, the unit certified had not been
extended to include part-time employees by voluntary recognition
and the unit at the time of the present application was the same as at
the date of certification. Six out of ten employees signed the
application for revocation and four of the applicants were part-time.
Of the two full-time signatories, one was a union member and one
was not. The final point of importance was that the application was
made while the union was on strike.
Section 27 of the Act states that where a trade union has been
certified for not less than 12 months and
The Board is satisfied that
(a) a significant number of members of the trade union allege
that the trade union is not adequately fulfilling its
responsibilities to the employees in the bargaining unit for
which it is certified; or
(b) the union no longer represents a majority of the employees in
the unit;
the Board upon application for revocation of certification may
order the taking of a vote to determine the wishes of the
employees in the unit concerning revocation or confirm the
certification in accordance with the result of the vote.
Thus, there are two ways in which a group of employees can apply
for revocation. First, by showing that a significant number of
members of the union allege that the union is not adequately
fulfilling its functions as a bargaining agent to the employees in the
unit. Second, by demonstrating that the union no longer represents a
majority of employees in the unit. In the present case, the Board had
occasion to discuss both these limbs.
section 27(b) does not mean "has as members" and that employees did not have to
resign from the union if they are to take advantage of section 27(b). Moreover,
Madam Justice Glube strongly indicated that the circumstances of a strike and the
Board taking this factor into account in deciding whether to order a vote might be
reviewable. We regard this as an extremely bad decision; one which completely
ignores the structure of the revocation provisions and industrial realities. Apart
from this, however, Glube J.'s decision is particularly unfortunate as it gives very
little, if any, guidance on what is the interpretation of section 27(b).
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The Board found that section 27(a) did not apply on the facts.
Because the unit had been defined by the Board as a unit offull-time
employees, it concluded that a significant number of employees had
not made the application. On the facts, only one member of the
union had made the allegation and this was insufficient. 76 The
Board did make clear, however, that it was not laying down any
percentage requirement; thus, you do not have to have 50% of the
members involved in the application. Nor do you have to have more
than one member; in some very small units, one may be sufficient.
The Board simply decided that on the facts of this case, one member
was not a significant number.
The Board did make one other significant point. The Nova Scotia
provision does not place any time restrictions on the application for
revocation apart from the 12 month condition precedent. In Ontario,
on the other hand, there is a specific period when a lawful strike is
in progress during which such application cannot be made. 77 In the
Henwood Foods case, the respondent union argued that despite the
silence in the Nova Scotia Act, the Board should exercise both its
general discretion to order a vote and its discretion to decide
whether a significant number of members are making the allegation
in light of the special vulnerability of unions during the strike. The
Board agreed that it should not too readily order a vote on an
78
Application for Revocation when a legal strike was current.
This approach makes eminently good sense for two reasons.
First, from the union's point of view, it is conceivable that support
will lag during a long and bitter strike. Members may not appreciate
whatever benefits the strike may bring them and, because the
withdrawal of support may only be temporary, the Board must be
very careful about giving it any effect. Moreover, any indication of
lack of faith may hurt the union in its negotiations. Secondly, it
must be borne in mind that the strike provides the employer with a
perfect opportunity to break the union. By stretching out
negotiations over a lengthy period, the employer can implicitly
encourage the withdrawal of support for the union. In other words,
what the Board is doing in its position on revocation applications
during lawful strikes is minimizing the consequences of that
collective action on the union's certification. Nor should this cause
76. Id. at 2-3
77. The Labour RelationsAct, R.S.O. 1970, c. 232, s. 53(3)
78. L.R.B. No. 2377 at 3
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management undue concern. A genuine employee application will
still be successful; they will simply have a heavier onus to satisfy.
Moreover, if in fact the union does not have any support, the
certification will be largely redundant as it will not be able to
bargaineffectively.
Finally, we should point out that it is a significant number of
members alleging lack of representation by the union that is
important. They are under no obligation to prove and the Board is
under no obligation to ascertain whether infact the union is properly
representing the employees. The employee allegations must of
79
course be in good faith but this is the only requirement.
The Board also had to consider the second limb of section 27
which requires that the union no longer represents a majority of
employees in the unit. It decided that "represents" means "has as
members" and that since only one of the full-time employees (6 in
number) and one of the members had signed the application, section
27(b) had not been satisfied. No proof of lack of union
80
representation had been tendered.
As the Board pointed out, this interpretation of "represents"
means that for an application to be successful under 27(b), it must
be demonstrated that a majority of employees are not members of
the union. This, in turn, means that people must resign from the
union if they wish to demonstrate lack of union representation. On
occasion this may cause problems if the union constitution or
security clause prevents resignation. However, as the Board pointed
out, in this situation the union members may make use of section
27(a) which is extremely widely worded and where withdrawal
from the union is not a prerequisite. It might be pointed out,
however, that resignation will not always be necessary. For
example, where a union has been certified with 52% of the work
force and after a period of time 10% of those members leave, a
majority of employees in the unit will not be represented by the
union. Presumably an application could be made in these
circumstances for revocation within section 27(b).
Two final points might be made which were not dealt with in the
Board decision in Henwood FoodsLtd. First, it should be noted that
the employees must indicate under section 27(a) that the union is not
fulfilling its proper functions. They may not merely indicate that
79. Id. at 2
80. Id. at 3
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they do not want to be a member of the union nor pay dues. If this
allegation is being made, presumably it must be done under section
27(b) after the employees have resigned. The application for
revocation must therefore be properly framed. 8 ' Second, the Board
discretion under section 27 is extremely wide. It has a discretion to
decide whether a "significant number" of members have made the
appropriate allegation. It has a discretion whether to order a vote
and a discretion whether to decertify in accordance with that vote.
Apart from the occasion of a lawful strike, this discretion will
presumably be utilized where the employer has been involved in
pressuring the employees into applying for decertification or where
perhaps a raiding union has been "persuading" members of the
incumbent union to decertify in too "insistent" a manner. One can
expect the Board to use this discretion quite freely.
Alteration of Terms and Conditions of Employment During the
"Freeze" Period
In Kentville Hospital Employees' Association and Kentville
Hospital Association,8 2 the Board had to determine whether the
employer had violated section 33(b) of the Trade Union Act, which
provides,
Where notice to commence collective bargaining has been given
under Section 31 or Section 32 or in accordance with a collective
agreement which provides for the revision of a provision of the
agreement, the employer shall not, without consent by the
certified or recognized bargaining agent or by the Board, increase
or decrease rates of wages or alter any other term or condition of
employment of employees in relation to whom notice to bargain
has been given until (a new collective agreement has been
concluded or conciliation procedures have been completed).
The facts were that Mr. Andrews, who was employed on full-time
casual basis at Miller Hospital, was ordered by his supervisor to
take part in in-service training for doctors outside his normal
working hours. There was no question that the employer had in the
past ordered Mr. Andrews to work paid overtime, and that he had
always complied. On this occasion, he refused and was dismissed.
The evidence disclosed that Mr. Andrews had originally agreed to
participate but that he changed his mind because he disagreed with
the format of the program. At that time, no collective agreement
8 1. See Form 6 of the Regulations Pursuant to the Trade Union Act

82. L.R.B. No. 2372, dated June 13, 1977
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was in force and the conciliation stage under section 33 had not been
completed. The question was whether the supervisor's order
constituted an alteration in the terms and conditions of employment
of Mr. Andrews without the union's consent under section 33(b).
The Board held that the section had not been violated on the
ground that Mr. Andrews was contractually obliged to work
overtime at his employer's request so that there was no alteration of
his terms and conditions of employment. 83 Further, the Board held
that the dismissal of an employee does not ipso facto constitute an
"alteration" for the purposes of establishing a violation of section
33(b) where there is no "alteration" of another term and condition
of employment associated with that dismissal. 8 4 Thus, if the
dismissal is lawful as being in accordance with any applicable
requirements for just cause, seniority, or due notice or wages in lieu
thereof, and it does not otherwise amount to an unfair labour
practice under the Act, the employee has no basis for a complaint. It
is submitted that the Board's decision is correct, for the purpose of
s.33(b) is to maintain the status quo once notice to bargain has been
given.
Enforcement of the Collective Agreement
This section focuses on the enforceability of the collective
agreement in two situations: first, during the currency of the
agreement; and second, after the expiry of the agreement when it is
sought to enforce its provisions through their incorporation into
individual employment contracts. Four recent court decisions are
examined: Ainscough, 8 5 decided on April 22, 1975 in the Supreme
Court of Canada; Winnipeg Teachers, 86 decided in the same court
on October 2 1975; Zwelling, 87 decided in the Ontario Court of
Appeal on December 4, 1975; and Brunet,8 8 decided on November
2, 1976, in the Supreme Court of Canada. These decisions are of
considerable importantance in Nova Scotia.
A. During the currency of the collective agreement.
There are two possible legal bases for enforcement by the courts of a
collective agreement:
83. Id. at 2
84. Id.
85. [1975154 D.L.R. (3d) 1, [19751 CLLC 15,253

86. [1975] CLLC 14,299

87.

[1976] CLLC 14,047

88. [1977]CLLC 14,067
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(a) through direct enforcement of the agreement by one of the
parties on whom labour relations legislation makes it legally
binding, namely the employer, the union and any employee in
the bargaining unit; 8 9
(b) through a contract action founded on the incorporation of the
provisions of the agreement into the individual employment
contracts of members of the work force.
(a) Direct enforcement
The preponderance of jurisprudence establishes that courts will not
permit an employee to enforce benefits under the collective
agreement without prior exhaustion of the grievance and arbitration
procedures in the agreement where enforcement would require the
court to interpret the agreement. 90 The courts will only permit such
an action where no question of interpretation is involved and the
employee is merely seeking an alternative device for collecting
ascertained benefits owing to him.
This reflects two policies. First, public policy endorses
arbitration as the appropriate forum for resolving grievances arising
under the collective agreement. Arbitration has the advantages over
civil litigation of relative speed, informality and cheapness, and the
arbitrator, generally selected by the parties themselves, brings
greater industrial relations expertise to bear on the problem than
does a judge. 9 1 Indeed, the thrust of recent labour relations
89. E.g., Nova Scotia Trade Union Act, s. 39.
90. Hamilton Street Railway Co. v. Northcott (1966), 58 D.L.R. (2d) 708,
(S.C.C.); Close v. Globe and Mail (1967), 60 D.L.R. (2d) 105 (Ont. C.A.);
Cummings v. Hydro Electric Power Commission of Ontario (1966, 54 D.L.R. (2d)
583 (Ont. H.C.); Shank v. KVP Co., [196612 O.R. 847 (Ont. H.Ct.) (per; Brooke
J.); Drogt v. Robson - Long Leathers Ltd., [1971] 3 O.R. 488 (Ont. Co.Ct.);
Ford v. Trustees of Ottawa Civic Hospital, [1973] 3 O.R. 437 (Ont. H.CT.) (per
LeiffJ.).
The policy of these decisions is given legislative force in Ontario in The Rights of
LabourAct R.S.O. 1970 c. 416 s. 3(3) and in Saskatchewan in the Trade Union Act
S.S. 1972 c. 137 s. 30. Other provinces follow this approach. See e.g., Tkach v.
Comstock Int'l Ltd. Allied Hydro Council of Manitoba (1973), 35 D.L.R. (3d)
626(Man. Q.B.); Caines v. Cape Breton Development Corp. (1973), 39 D.L.R.
(3d) 606 (N.S.S.C.): Downey v. Scotia Square Hotel Ltd. (1974), 55 D.L.R. (3d)
300 (N.S.S.C.); Acadia Pulp and Paper Ltd. v. Int'l B'hd of Pulp, Sulphite and
Paper Mill Workers (1970), 15 D.L.R. (3d) 227 (N.B.S.C. in chambers); but
compare Woods v. Miramichi Hospital (1967), 59 D.L.R. (2d) 29 (N.B.S.C.,
App. Div.) and Logan v. Board of School Trustees District #1 (1974), 40 D.L.R.
(3d) 152 (N.B.S.C., App. Div.)
91. See, however, the criticisms of Weiler in The Labour Boardand the Collective
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legislation in some provinces, and in the Newfoundland Association
of Public Employees case referred to below,9 2 is to limit the scope
of judicial intervention in grievance arbitration. Second, public
policy recognizes that trade unions have a legitimate interest in
"screening" grievances through their exclusive control over access
93
to the higher echelons of the grievance and arbitration procedures,
provided that the union does not abuse its power as exclusive
bargaining agent by victimizing an individual worker or "trading
off" his legitimate grievance so as unfairly to deny him his rightful
expectations under the collective aggreement. To permit judicial
enforcement of the collective agreement would undercut the unions'
"screening function". Save for few exceptions, 94 the balance
between the interests of the union and the individual employee has
been drawn by imposing a "duty of fair representation" on the
union, either by statute as in Ontario and British Columbia or at
common law as in other provinces, 9 5 whilst preserving the
arbitrator's exclusive jurisdiction to interpret and resolve "rights"
grievances, at least unless and until violation of the duty of fair
representation is established.
These issues were considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in
Agreement (Address to the National Academy of Arbitrators, Toronto, April 14,

1977)
92. Infra, Notes 161 and 199 ff. and accompanying text
93. See A. Cox, Individual Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements
(1957), 8 Labor L.J. 850, especially at 854-859
94. E.g., Logan and Woods, supra, note 90; Adcock v. Algoma Steel Corp.
(1968), 70 D.L.R. (2d) 246 (Grant J.) especially at 251. Syrett v. TransconaSpringfield School Div. #12 (1976), 67 D.L.R. (3d) 568 (Man. Q.B.). See also
Ferguson v. Boardof Educationfor the City of Toronto, [1972] 3 0.R. 587 (Ont.
H. Ct.), the dubious reasoning of which was disapproved in Denis v.
Galivay-Realty, [1973] 30.R. 15 (Ont. Co. Ct.).
95. Only The Ontario Labour Relations Act s. 60 and the British Columbia Labour
Code s. 7(1) provide statutory duties. In other provinces, the employee must rely
on a common law action, as in Fisher v. Pemberton (1970), 8 D.L.R. (3d) 521
(B.C.S.C.). See B. Adel], The Duty ofFairRepresentationin Effective Protection
for IndividualRights in Collective Agreements 25 Industrial Relations No. 3. Legal
commentators should not ignore the practical constraints on abuses by the union,
e.g., adverse publicity, the internal institutions of "union democracy" and the role
of the C.L.C. Ombudsman under the C.L.C. Constitution (pp. 46-47). Section 14
(1) of the Nova Scotia Trade Union Act does not, it is submitted, impose a duty of
"fair representation" on the union nor a duty of "fair treatment" on the employer.
Rather, it allows the employee to by-pass the collective institutions for dispute
resolution and go directly to the employer, but the latter can say "no" at his
discretion. The section's function appears to be limited to striking down provisions
in the collective agreement or the union rule book which purport to penalize the
employee or otherwise prevent him from going directly to his employer.
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General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. Brunet et al.9 6 The facts
involved an employee who was discharged when he asked to be
assigned to a lighter job following an injury at work..He claimed
that the collective agreement entitled him to such a job but that his
union, which controlled access to the higher stages of the grievance
procedure, including arbitration, had either refused or neglected to
process his grievance. He requested the Court to enforce the
relevant article in the agreement by reinstating him in the lighter
job, with an award of damages for lost work against the union and
the employer. Mr. Justice Pigeon, delivering judgment for the
Court, dismissed the plaintiff's action on the ground that it would
require the Court to usurp the function of arbitrator by interpreting
and applying the relevant provision in the collective agreement. He
said that this would not only run counter to section 88 of the Quebec
Labour Code, which provides for compulsory "arbitration" as the
terminal step in resolving "rights" disputes, but also to those
provisions in the collective agreement itself which were to the same
effect. He restricted the court's jurisdiction to enforce provisions of
collective agreements to the following situations. First, where the
arbitrator has made an award and the court is asked either to enforce
that award or to calculate benefits owed to an employee pursuant to
the correct formula as determined by the award. Second, where the
arbitrator has not made an award but the parties are agreed as to the
correct amount of benefits owed to the employee. Third, and most
significant, he hinted that the court may enforce a provision of the
agreement where the union refuses "in bad faith" to process a
grievance, notwithstanding that this requires the court to interpret
and apply the relevant provision. 9 7 It follows that an employee
could not seek judicial enforcement under this head prior to his
attempting to seek satisfaction under the machinery established by
the collective agreement. The issue did not arise on the facts of the
case as there was no evidence of union "bad faith". However, Mr.
Justice Pigeon's remarks do have important implications where the
union is in breach of its "duty of fair representation".
In Nova Scotia, the "duty of fair representation, if it exists at all,
must rest on a common law suit for breach of statutory duty
following the decision of the British Columbia Supreme Court in
Fisher v. Pemberton,98 the only case to arise on the point in
96. (1977) 77 CLLC, 14067 (S.C.C.)
97. Id. at para. 14596 and para. 14598

98. Supra, note 95
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Canada. In that case the court, having established breach of the
duty, measured the plaintiff's resulting financial loss by reference to
the likelihood of his winning in arbitration. Since his chances of
success were remote, nominal compensation was awarded. Strictly
speaking, this remedy did not involve the court enforcing the
collective agreement as such; rather, it was enforcing the "duty of
fair representation" and merely measuring the damage flowing
from breach of that duty by reference to the probabilities of the
arbitratorenforcing the agreement in the plaintiff's favour had the
grievance proceeded to arbitration. In practice, this does require the
court to perform the arbitrator's role of interpreting the agreement,
which itself makes for unsound policy, but the court does not step
into the arbitrator's shoes to enforce the agreement. However, Mr.
Justice Pigeon appears to suggest that the court may assume the
enforcement powers of the arbitrator as if the court itself were the
arbitrator, which is technically different from enforcing an
independent "duty of fair representation". Therefore, Mr. Justice
Pigeon's remarks go beyond Fisher v. Pemberton and in so doing
create additional problems not raised by that decision.
First, many collective agreements provide for "mandatory" time
limits within which arbitration must be invoked, as a condition
precedent to the arbitrator having jurisdiction. If the court were
enforcing the collective agreement qua arbitrator, as Mr. Justice
Pigeon implies, it would presumably have to comply with the time
limits in light of the Port Arthur 9 9 decision and the provision
common to collective agreements precluding modification of its
terms by the arbitrator. The court's jurisdiction would probably not
extend to rewriting the terms of the agreement. Does this mean that
the court would be precluded from enforcing the agreement if the
hearing were not held within the time limits,'o0 0 or alternatively, if
the hearing were untimely but civil action was commenced within
the time limits? It is arguable, though not established law, that this
problem would not arise under the Fisher v. Pemberton approach
because the court is not enforcing the agreement itself, but
speculating as to the outcome of arbitration were the arbitrator to
have jurisdiction to hear the case.
Second, the court's remedial powers under both the Pigeon J. and
the Fisherv. Pemberton approaches are unsatisfactory as compared
99. (1967), 70 D.L.R. (2d) 693 (S.C.C.)
100. Pigeon J. hints that this may be the case. See para. 14598
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to the remedies available in provinces which have a statutory "duty
of fair representation" administered by a labour relations board. In
Ontario, the Board has recently spelled out the available remedies
for breach of section 60 of the Ontario Labour Relations Act. 101 If
the union has wrongfully failed to take a grievance to arbitration,
the Board, if it considers arbitration to be the appropriate remedy,
can order the union to arbitrate along with an order modifying the
agreement, for example, waiving the time limit provisions so as to
permit arbitration. It the Board has reason to believe that the union
will not represent fairly the employee in arbitration, it can order the
union to retain counsel acceptable to the employee at the union's
cost. 10 2 In addition, the Board can make an order at the date of the
hearing requiring the union and employer to compensate the
employee for financial loss aggravated by the violation of the duty
contingent upon his grievance being successful in arbitration.1 0 3 In
these provinces, it is both undesirable and unnecessary for the court
to intervene because the labour boards are the most suitable body to
determine whether a violation of the duty has occurred, and if so,
what in their arsenal of remedies is the most appropriate on the
facts.
If Mr. Justice Pigeon's approach were followed in provinces not
having a statutory "duty of fair representation", the court could
probably not arbitrate the grievance itself in the face of expired
"mandatory" time limits, nor could it avail itself of the statutory
discretion specifically conferred upon "arbitrators" - not courts
04
- to extend time limits in provinces having such legislation. 1
(The Nova Scotia Trade Union Act does not include this provision.)
Even if the court were to arbitrate the grievance, it probably could
not avail itself of the statutory power conferred specifically on
05
"arbitrators" to order a substitute for the employer's penalty,'
although this may not be so important after the Newfoundland
Association of Public Employees case.' 0 6 Possibly, the court could
order reinstatement in unfair discharge grievances after the
101. Mohammed and Local 439 UA W v. Massey Ferguson [1977] OLRB REP.

216.
102. E.g., Murphy v. Int'l. Printing and Graphic Communications Union Local
482 (1977), March 27th File No. 1687-76-U
103. As inMurphy, Id.
104. The OntarioLabour Relations Act, s. 37(5) (a); Manitoba Labour Relations
act, s. 111.2; British Columbia Labour Code s. 98(e)
105. Nova Scotia Trade Union Act, s 41(d) (ii)
106. Infra, Notes 161 and 199 ff and accompanying text.
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AinscoughI0 7 decision because it would not be enforcing an
employment contract but a collective agreement. However, were
the employee to seek reinstatement after the expiry of the collective
agreement/"freeze" on the basis that the provisions of the defunct
agreement remain in force through their incorporation into his
employment contract, then damages alone would be recoverable
because courts will not order specific performance of employment
contracts. In addition, the labour relations legislation in some
provinces appears to preclude court enforcement either specifically
or because it requires all "rights" disputes to be resolved by final
and binding "arbitration", not "arbitration or otherwise" as in
Nova Scotia. 108 In those provinces, it is probable that courts do not
constitute "arbitration". These problems may be avoided under the
Fisher v. Pemberton approach by arguing that the court is not
setting itself up as arbitrator to enforce the agreement, but is
speculating as to what an arbitrator armed with the powers of his
position would do were he to resolve the case.
The most attractive course of action for a court faced with a
violation of the "duty of fair representation" seems to be to remit
the case to arbitration under the collective agreement. The court in
Fisherv. Pemberton did not consider this, but had the facts of that
case disclosed a manifestly unjust dismissal for which reinstatement
was the appropriate remedy, they would have had to consider it
because specific performance at that time was unavailable. If the
court were to remit the case to arbitration - and it is not established
that the court has jurisdiction to do so - the problem arises whether
the arbitrator would have jurisdiction in the face of expired
"mandatory" time limits. It is doubtful that the court could modify
the time limits, and the union and employer would probably not be
willing to waive them so that the grievance could be heard. In
provinces where the arbitrator has a statutory discretion to extend
time limits this problem could be circumvented, but the Nova Scotia
107. See supra, note 85
108. As in the Prince Edward Island Labour Act, s. 36(l), the Quebec Labour
Code, s. 88, and The Ontario Labour Relations Act, s. 37(1). See also s. 3(3) of
The OntarioRights of Labour Act and s. 30 of the Saskatchewan Trade Union Act
which appear to preclude Pigeon J's approach in those provinces. Even where the
legislation does use "or otherwise", the legislative intent in that arbitration is the
most appropriate forum, e.g., General Teamsters Local 362 v. Midland Superior
Express, [1974)2 W.W.R. 490, at 504-5 (per Prowse J. A.) (Alta. Sup. Ct., App.
Div.). Quaere: can the parties in their collective agreement expressly provide that
the court is to be their "arbitrator"?
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Trade Union Act has no such provision. Further, even if the
arbitrator has jurisdiction, the courts do not have the power to order
the union to hire a lawyer to ensure fair representation for the
employee in arbitration.
It is submitted that the unsound policy and the minefield of legal
uncertainties involved in the court's dealing with "fair representation" cases make it essential for Nova Scotia to introduce a
statutory "duty of fair representation" administered by the labour
Relations Board. Unfortunately, it is difficult to see where the
political pressure for such a change could be generated since neither
management nor labour would be overjoyed with it.
Court enforcement of the collective agreement where "fair
representation" is not at issue was considered by the Supreme Court
of Canada in Winnipeg Teachers' Association No. 1 of the Manitoba
Teachers' Society v. Winnipeg School Division No. 1. 109 During
negotiations for renewal of a collective agreement, but while the
existing agreement was still in force, the Teachers' Association
directed its members to "work to rule" by refusing to supervise the
children at their lunchtime meals, which the Association considered
to be a voluntary service. The employer alleged that school teachers
were legally obliged to supervise school lunches under the
collective agreement, which entrenched the Code of Rules and
Regulations of the Division which in turn obliged teachers to "...
make provision for the supervision of the school during the noon
recess . . ." and to ". . . carry out their duties in accordance with
the regulations . . . of the school system under the direction of the

principal." Accordingly, the employer sought compensation for the
cost of replacement supervisors arising from the Association's
violation of the collective agreement.
Three questions faced the Court. First, whether the dispute
should be remitted to arbitration under the collective agreement
rather than be resolved in court. Second, whether the collective
agreement obliged teachers to perform lunchtime supervision
duties. Third, whether the Association was in breach of the
collective agreement, assuming it made lunchtime supervision
obligatory.
As to the first question, Martland J., speaking for the majority,
held that the Court had jurisdiction because both parties agreed that
it should hear the case without having challenged its jurisdiction in
109. (1975) 75 CLLC 14,299
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the lower courts. He relied on the judgement of Laskin C.J. in
Ainscough" ° to that effect. It is submitted however that Laskin C.J.
did not intend in Ainscough to formulate a rule of general
application that the courts have jurisdiction whenever the parties so
agree. Indeed, he stated that, "This Court refrained therefore in this
case from taking any position on this question

. ..

",'

Laskin C.J.

disagreed with Martland J., saying that,
in fine, what the parties brought before the Court in this case was
a matter which should have been submitted in the first place to
adjustment, and if not adjusted, to arbitration under Article II (the
arbitration procedure in the collective agreement). Their consent
or choice to go the the Courts cannot of itself command
the
2
Courts' intercession by way of original adjudication. "1
It is submitted that this view makes for sound policy for the
reasons stated earlier. Further, Martland J.'s approach appears to
conflict with section 381 (1) of the Manitoba Public Schools Act, 113
which establishes the legal regime for labour relations in the
industry. That section requires all disputes arising under the
collective agreement to be resolved by "negotiation, conciliation
and arbitration, or any of those means". Whereas both parties may
waive by agreement a similar provision in their collective
agreement, they cannot waive a statutory obligation!
As to the second question, the Court unanimously held that
lunchtime supervision was obligatory upon teachers so that any
teacher who refused to undertake it was in breach of the collective
agreement and therefore subject to disciplinary action. This
involved a very sensitive interpretation of the collective agreement.
Laskin C.J., with whom the majority agreed said,
Almost any contract of service or collective agreement which
envisages service especially in a professional enterprise, can be
frustrated by insistence on "work to rule" if it be the case that
nothing that has been expressed can be asked of the employee.
Before such a position can be taken I would expect that an
express provision to that effect would be included in the contract
or in the collective agreement. Contract relations of the kind in
existence here must surely be governed by standards of
reasonableness in assessing the degree to which an employer or a
supervisor may call for the performance of duties which are not
110.
111.
112.
113.

Supra, note 85
(1975), 75 CLLC 14,299, at 15,254
Id. at 15380. Supra, note 18
The PublicSchools Act, R.S.M. 1970, c.P250
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expressly spelled out. They must be related to the enterprise and
be seen as fair to the employee and in furtherance of the principal
duties to which he is expressly committed. 114
These remarks suggest that the legal basis of the employees'
obligation to perform lunchtime supervision was the employer's
power to issue orders pursuant to its residual "right to manage" in
respect to matters not covered by the collective agreement. This
right, which exists irrespective of a "management rights" article in
the collective agreement, 1 5 was reinforced by the entrenchment
into the collective agreement of the Code of Rules and Regulations.
Laskin C.J.'s remarks are therefore consistent with prior arbitral
jurisprudence which establishes that where management issues
work directives, either through an "entrenchment" article or
through its residual "right to manage", such rules must be reasonable
as to their content and enforcement, they must be consistent with the
express terms of the agreement and they must be brought to the
attention of employees affected by them. 116 However, suppose that
workers are expressly obliged to perform certain tasks under the
collective agreement but, as part of a "work to rule" campaign,
perform them with such meticulous attention to detail that the job is
slowed down as a consequence? Can it be said that the employees
are in breach of the collective agreement? Laskin C.J. preferred to
leave this question unanswered. An English Court of Appeal
decision" 7 suggests that a "work to rule" is not in breach of the
employment contract where the rule in question is itself a term of
the contract. Provided that the employee performs the task to the
letter of his contract, he is not in breach by virtue only of
withdrawing his "goodwill". 1 8 However, where the rule is not
itself a contractual term, but is a directive as to how the task should
be performed made pursuant to the employer's right to issue lawful
and reasonable orders, then meticulous observance of that rule can
amount to a breach of contract under three possible analyses. First,
Lord Denning said that there is an implied term in the contract that
the employee shall not carry out orders so as to wilfully disrupt
114. Supra, note 111 at 15380-15381
115. CanadianBroadcastingCorp. (1973), 8 L.A.C. (2d) 263 (Shime)
116. K.V.P. Co. (1965), 16 L.A.C. 73 (Robinson); INCO. v. U.A.W. (1977), 13
Lab. Arb. News, No. 4 (Shime); Dominion StoresLtd. (1976), 11 L.A.C. (2d) 401
(Shime)
117. Secretary of State for Employment v. A.S.L.E.F. (No. 2), [1972] 2 All E.R.
949
118. Per Lord Denning at 979 and Lord Roskill at 981

Labour Law 433

business operations. 119 Second, Lord Roskill suggested that there is
an implied term that the employee shall not carry out orders in an
unreasonable manner which has the effect of disrupting the
business.12 0 This differs from Lord Denning's analysis in its
emphasis on consequences rather than intent. Third, Lord Buckley
said that there is an implied term that the employee shall promote
the commercial objectives of the enterprise and not carry out orders
in an unreasonable manner which frustrates those objectives. 121
Although the standards of the common law are often unacceptable in grievance arbitration, it may nonetheless be possible that
arbitrators could analogize to these approaches and hold a "work to
rule" to be in breach of the collective agreement where an employee
unreasonably performed an order so as seriously to disrupt
production, but not where the employee performs the job in the
exact manner prescribed by a term of the collective agreement.
Indeed, Laskin C.J. may have hinted at Lord Roskill's approach
when he spoke of "work to rules" "frustrating" the purpose of the
working relationship.
The legal status of "work to rule" may be vital, given that the
definition of "strike" in section l(1) (v) of the Nova Scotia Trade
Union Act includes a
continue to work ...

".
"

.. cessation of work or refusal to work or
Presumably, this refers to "work" which

the employee is legally bound to perform,' 22 otherwise the bizarre
consequence would follow that employees could be forced by an
injunction or a cease and desist order to do work which they have
not contracted to do. In effect, the court or Board would be
re-writing the wage-work bargain! The word ".

.

. includes . . ."

in section 1(1) (v) could permit the court or Board to determine that
a "work to rule" does constitute a "strike", notwithstanding that
the employees are not in breach of some other obligation under the
collective agreement, but the same bizarre consequence would
follow again! In the Winnipeg Teachers case, Laskin C.J. held that
the "work to rule" was not a "strike", although the matter was not
119. Id. at 986-987
120. Id. at 980
121. Id. at 971-972
122. In TransportLabour Relations v. General Truck Drivers and Helpers Union
Local No. 31 (1975), 54 D.L.R. (3d) 457 (B.C.S.C.) the "work to rule", which
took the form of a slowdown, was illegal because, first, a slowdown by definition
means that work is performed at a slower rate than is legally required under the
collective agreement and, second, the definition of "strike" in the Canada Labour
Code s. 107(1) (b) expressly includes a "slowdown".
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argued. He appeared to restrict "strikes" to the situation where
workers go "off their jobs".' 23 It is submitted that this is overly
narrow both in terms of industrial relations reality and in terms of
the statutory definitions of "strike" in all provincial labour relations
statutes.
The better view, it is submitted, is that "work to rules" should
only constitute "strikes" when the employees are in breach of their
obligation to obey lawful and reasonable orders under the collective
agreement. This gives the courts and labour relations boards broad
scope for interpreting the collective agreement because it requires
an examination of the employees' obligations under the agreement
as an integral step in determining whether there is a "strike".
Where an employer alleges that an illegal strike has occurred he will
normally seek an interlocutory injunction in the courts for breach of
the statute (often because he believes the courts will give him a
more sympathetic hearing!) or a "cease and desist" order in the
labour relations board for an unfair labour practice. It is clear also
that arbitrators have jurisdiction to award injunctions which are then
filed as orders of the court.' 24 It could be argued that employers
alleging an illegal "strike" should be compelled to seek relief in
arbitration, but the delay in establishing arbitration may make this
impractical. One solution is to confer exclusive jurisdiction in
"illegal" strikes on the labour relations board, which is more
sensitive to the industrial relations implications of interpreting the
25
collective agreement than are judges. 1
As to the third question, namely whether the Association was in
breach of the collective agreement, the majority of the Court held
that it was. Laskin C.J. dissented on the ground that the Association
was not in breach of any obligation specifically incumbent upon
itself, notwithstanding that it had instructed its members to "work
to rule" in breach of their obligations. He said, "such a claim could
arise in contract against the Association only if it had expressly
underwritten the performance by the individual teachers of their
respective individual contractual obligations. ."126 Nor he said,
was the Association liable in the torts of inducing breach of contract
123. Atpara. 15381

124. See Samuel Cooper and Co. Ltd. and Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers Union
(1973), 35 D.L.R. (3d) 501 (Ont. Div. Ct.)
125. See the British Columbia Labour Code, ss. 31, 32, 33 and 34(2) which
restricts massively the courts' role.
126. Atpara. 15382
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and interference with contractual relations by unlawful means.
The thrust of Marland J.'s reasoning, on the other hand, seems to
be that the Association was in breach of its general and overriding
obligation to ensure that the terms of the collective agreement were
observed by calling on its members to "work to rule" without first
determing the legality of that action.
Laskin C.J. took an overly narrow view that the Association had
not violated the grievance and arbitration proceduie because the
employer had agreed to process the dispute in court, thereby
waiving any breach. This misses the point that the union specifically
condoned its members' disobedience of management orders in order
to exert economic pressure on the employer withoutfirst determining
the legality of their actions. It is a well-established rule in arbitratioi
that the employer's orders must be obeyed and then grieved, unless
the employee honestly and reasonably believes the order to be
unsafe, illegal or beyond his physical capacity. 127 It is no
justification for disobedience that there is a reasonable doubt as to
the correct interpretation of the collective agreement. It is also
well-established that a union is liable for expressly directing its
28
members to exert illegal economic pressure on the employer. 1
(b) The incorporation theory during the currency of the collective
agreement
This theory seeks to replace the enforcement machinery of the
collective agreement with that of the employment contract as an
alternative device for protecting the employees' benefits under the
collective agreement. The argument is that certain provisions of the
collective agreement are incorporated into, and become enforceable
through, the employment contracts of the work force which co-exist
with the collective agreement.' 2 9 The theory was always of
questionable validity in a statutory framework of labour relations
whose thrust is to minimize the role of common law in collective
bargaining relationships' 3 0 and created a minefield of legal
127. E.g., Re Seneca College (1976), 12 L.A.C. (2d) 27 (Weatherhill)
128. See Re Regent Refining and Atomic Workers (1977), 13 L.A.C. (2d) 88
(Weatherhill)
129. See B. Adell, The Legal Status of Collective Agreements in England, the
United States and Canada (Ontario: Queen's University Industrial Relations
Centre, 1970) at 203-27
130. C.P.R. v. Zanbri (Royal York) (1962), 34 D.L.R. (2d) 654 (S.C.C.( (per
Judson J.) at 666, but contrast his irreconcilable dictum in Syndicat Catholique des
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uncertainties. For instance, are certain provisions of the collective
agreement, notably the grievance and arbitration procedures,
inherently unsuitable for incorporation into the contract between
employer and employee? 13 1 What is theprocess of incorporation: is
it automatic or by implication based on the parties' intentions and
their customs or usages? The attraction of the theory was that it
enabled courts to hear an employee's grievance in circumstances
where the courts suspected that the union would not process it fairly
or competently through the grievance and arbitration procedures. As
such, it was a judicial reinforcement of the "duty of fair
representation". In addition, the theory arguably could have been
utilized to resolve grievances that were "untimely" under the
collective agreement, though there are no cases on that point.
In McGavin Toastmaster v. Ainscough 132 the Supreme Court of
Canada appears to have delivered the incorporation theory a death
blow, at least in situations where the collective agreement remains
in force. Laskin C.J., for the majority, rejected the employment
contract analysis, saying
I do not think that in the face of labour relations legislation such
as existed at the material time in British Columbia, in the face of
the certification of the union, of which the plaintiffs were
members, as bargaining agent of the specified unit of employees
of the company and in the face of the collective agreement in
force between the union and the appellant company, it is possible
to speak of individual contracts of employment and to treat the
collective agreement as a mere appendage of individual
relationships...
The common law as it applies to individual employment
contracts is no longer relevant to employer-employee relations
governed by a collective agreement which, as the one involved
here, deals with discharge, termination of employment, serverance pay and a host of other matters that have been negotiated
between union and company as the principal parties
thereto... 133
This appears to reject the validity of the incorporation theory, at
least during the subsistence of the collective agreement. 134 The role
Employes de Magasins de Quebec Inc. v. Compagnie Paquet Ltee (1959), 18
D.L.R. (2d) 346 (S.C.C.) at 354-55.
131. Infra
132. (1975), 54 D.L.R. (3d) 1; 75 CLLC 15253 (S.C.C.)
133. Id. at 5-6, [1975] CLLC at 15256
134. Ainscough has significant implications for the legal position of striking
employees. See G. England, The Legal Response to Striking at the Individual level

Labour Law 437

of the employment contract is restricted to fixing the initial
"wage-work" bargain between employer and employee at the
hiring stage, whereupon it disappears and is replaced by the
collective agreement as the exclusive source of job regulation. Even
at the hiring stage, the collective agreement will play the dominant
role in a pre-entry closed shop situation, although clearly the
employee must enter into a contractual relationship with the
35
employer as well as acquire union membership. '
B. After the expiry of the collective agreement:
incorporationby "reference back".
Laskin C.J.'s judgement in Ainscough does not expressly preclude
incorporation of the terms of a defunct collective agreement into the
employment contract after the expiry of the collective agreement
and the statutory "freeze", although the thrust of his reasoning is
that this would be somewhat out of place in the statutory framework
of collective bargaining. In Re Telegram Publishing Co. Ltd. and
Zwelling and Essig, 136 the Ontario Court of Appeal suggested that,
in certain circumstances, incorporation of the provisions of an
expired collective agreement into the employment contract is
permissable. The implications of this decision are clearly important
in Nova Scotia.
The facts in Zwelling involved a collective agreement between the
owners of a Toronto newspaper and a union which contained a clause
entitling employees to serverance pay upon dismissal or "economy
lay-off". Some time after the agreement and the statutory "freeze"
period on changes in wages and working conditions had expired the
newspaper closed down and the work force was discharged. One
issue was whether two of the employees could enforce the severance
pay provision by an action on their employment contracts,
notwithstanding that the collective agreement was no longer in
force. The Court held that one of the employees succeeded but the
other failed because he had resigned voluntarily and therefore had
in the Common Law Jurisdictions in Canada (1976), 3 Dal. L.J. 440. As to the
situation when the agreement expires, see infra.
135. See 0. Kahn-Freund, A Note on Status and Contractin British Labour Law
(1967), 30 M.L.R. 635 and the comments in Re Telegram Publishing Co. Ltd. and
Zwelling et al. (1976), 76 CLLC 14,047 at para. 14484 (per Kelly J.A.) (Ont.
C.A.).
136. Id.
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not been dismissed or laid off within the meaning of the collective
agreement. Kelly J.A. said,
.... the accepted view appears to be that where, after the
collective agreement has expired, the employee has continued to
work for the employer and the employer has continued to accept
the benefits of his services, there being no agreement to the
contrary, and no other circumstances from which there may be
implied terms and conditions of employment different from those
set out in the collective agreement, the terms and conditions of
employment after expiry are to be implied and would be similar
to those set out in the collective agreement which related
directly
37
to the individual employer-employee relationship. 1
This decision creates a minefield of legal problems.
First, Kelly J.A. clearly envisaged the process by which the terms
of the collective agreement were incorporated in the employee's
individual contract of employment - it being the parties' intention
to "refer back" to the collective agreement to provide the terms and
conditions of the employment relationship. This enabled him to
circumvent the terminal date article in the collective agreement
which would otherwise suggest that its provisions had lapsed as of
the specified date. 138 On the facts of the case, he was able to
construe two memoranda sent to the employees by the employer
offering continuation of employment on the old terms as an express
"reference back".
Express "reference back" is unlikely to be common. More often
than not the parties will simply not have considered how their
relationship is to be governed after the collective agreement ends.
Employers would normally not be willing to tie their hands by
agreeing to express incorporation; rather, their attitude is more
likely to be that "everything is up for grabs". Indeed, the lifting of
the statutory "freeze", during which unilateral alteration of
employment terms is prohibited, reinforces that attitude.
However, Kelly J.A. also suggested that there is a rebuttable
presumption that the parties impliedly intend the old terms of
employment to be incorporated into the employment contract
arising from the sole fact that the employees continue working. It
remains to be seen what conduct of the parties will suffice to rebut
that presumption. Where no work intercedes between the lifting of
the statutory "freeze" and either the occurrence of a strike, lockout
137. Id. at 14485
138. See the Ferguson and Denis cases, supra, note 94.
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or a unilateral alteration of the terms of the employment by the
employer presumably the presumption is rebutted. This is arguably
also the case where the employer expressly reserves the right to
dictate the terms of employment on a day-to-day basis. Where work
does continue it is questionable that the parties intend to incorporate
more than the "everyday" provisions on wages, hours, and perhaps
pensions where the employer continues to make contributions. The
less commonplace provisions such as seniority, severance,
holidays, sick pays, grievance procedure, and the like, which are
not observed daily but only when the contingency in question arises,
are less likely to be impliedly incorporated, at least until the
contingency has materialized on one, or probably several,
occasions.
Furthermore, Kelly J.A. did not explore the role of the union in
the incorporation process. It is an unfair labour practice for the
employer to regulate terms of employment on an individual basis
directly with one or more employees so long as the union remains as
the exclusive bargaining agent.' 3 9 Express incorporation arrangements directly with the employee are clearly impermissable, but
what about implied incorporation based on the direct treatment of
employees by the employer? It is not clear whether the employer
should first clear such treatment with the union, or whether the
union's silent acquiescence will suffice to avoid an unfair labour
practice. Nor did Kelly J.A. consider the inference raised by the
lifting of statutory "freeze" that the employer is thereafter free to
impose new terms, at least unless and until he expressly contracts
away that right in a subsequent collective agreement. Once terms
are incorporated into the employment contract, unilateral variation
of them by the employer constitutes a repudiation, unless the union
(but presumably not individual employees) accedes to a consensual
amendment of the contracts. In practice, the employees cannot
enforce the old terms because specific performance is unavailable in
court, but they can recover damages. Thus, if an employer wishes to
avoid the bad publicity of contract breaking, he must either observe
the old terms, thereby severely tying his hands, or impose a
"lock-out" within the statutory definition, 140 thereby attracting
worse publicity and a full scale battle with the union! What is clear
from the foregoing is that lawyers will have a field day in arguing
whether there has been an implied "preference back"!
139. Trade Union Act. s. 51(1) (a)
140. Trade Union Acts. 51(1) (0)
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A second problem arising from the Zwelling decision, even
assuming an express or implied "reference back", is that it is not
certain whether all the provisions of the defunct collective
agreement are suitable for incorporation as terms of an ihdividual
employment contract. Some may be too vaguely worded to be
enforceable. Others are intended to regulate exclusively relationships between the collective parties, for example, a clause giving
the union access to information, or recognizing the rights and
facilities of shop stewards. 141 In Zwelling, Kelly J. A. appeared to
adopt the approach of the Minister's designee, Carter, 142 that only
provisions which "directly relate" to the individual employeremployee relationship are capable of incorporation.
Applying Carter's test, it is questionable whether the grievance
and arbitration procedures can be incorporated, for although they
furnish the enforcement machinery for individual rights their
paramount function is to preserve industrial peace between the
collective parties. Insofar as the incorporation of such procedures
connotes that the employee can utilize them as of right, privity
appears to be offended in that the union, which is not a party to the
employment contract but without whose co-operation the procedures are inoperable, is compelled to co-operate. 143 Thus, if the
procedures do not expressly reserve the union's "vetting" rights,
their incorporation clearly offends privity. Where the union is
expressly empowered to "vett" grievances, presumably the privity
problem can be circumvented by viewing the employees' right to
utilize procedure as subject to the condition precedent that the union
agrees to co-operate. The privity problem could also be avoided by
the court implying a term in the contract of union membership that
the union agrees to co-operate, but this would deny the union's
legitimate interest in "screening" disputes, leave non-unionists
unprotected and generally entangle the court in the legal jungle of
union rule books. Alternatively, the court itself could simply
interpret and enforce the provision in question, were the union to
refuse to co-operate, but this makes for bad law and policy for the
141. Quaere: is the obligation to join the union under a closed/union/agency shop
article suitable for incorporation?
142. (1973), 1 L.A.C. (2d) I at 16-17 (Ontario employment standards
determination)
143. If the union refuses to co-operate in breach of its "duty of fair
representation", the court would be faced with the problem of appropriate
remedies, supra.
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reasons given earlier. 144 Apart from one decision of the British
Columbia Supreme Court, 145 which was disapproved by Fraser J.in
the Divisional Court in Zwelling, 1 4 6 who was not overruled by the
Appeal Court on that point, there is no Canadian decision favouring
the incorporation of the grievance and arbitration procedures. Dean
Adell1 47 has argued in favour of incorporation on the ground that
the grievance and arbitration procedures along with guaranteed
industrial peace represent the quid pro quo for the employer
conceding substantive benefits. However, the argument does not
compare like with like: it is precisely because grievance resolution
machinery is procedural - not substantive - that it is conceptually
different and arguably unsuitable for incorporation. Furthermore, it
is established that the employer has no legal quarantee of industrial
peace after the "freeze" lifts irrespective of the common law
employment contract. 148 American courts regard the grievance and
arbitration procedures as unsuitable for incorporation, 1 4 9 and in
Britain, at least before the enactment of recent legislation, it was
doubted seriously whet they could be incorporated. 150
One eminent British academic' 5 ' has argued that the "institutional nature" of pension schemes, which often involve a third party
insurance company, makes them unsuitable for incorporation, but in
Canada there is one decision suggesting the opposite. 152
This question of what provisions are suitable for incorporation is
not of academic interest only, for if the grievance and arbitration
procedures are not incorporated, the employees' rights must fail for
144. Supra
145. Prince Rupert Fishermen's Co-operative Assoc. v. United Fishermen and

Allied Workers Union (1969), 66 W.W.R. 43 (B.C.S.C.)
146. (1974), 1O.R. (2d) 592 (Ont. Div. Ct.)
147. Supra, note 129
148. This is the effect of the Royal York case, supra, note 130
149. Procter and Gamble Id. v. Gamble Mfg. Co. (1962), 312 F (2d) 181 at
184-85
150. See K. W. Wedderburn, The Worker and the Law (2nd Ed., Harmondsworth,
197 1) at 193-96. See now the effect of the Contracts of Employment Act 1972 c. 53
s. 4(2) as am. by the Employment Protection Act 1975 c. 71 schedule 16, Part II
para. 5, and the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 c. 52 s. 18(4).
151. 0. Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law (Stevens, 1972) at 149
152. In Re Int'l Assoc. of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Flir Flon Lodge
1848 and Hudson's Bay Mining and Smelting Co. Ltd. (1968), 66 D.L.R. (2d) I
(S.C.C.) it was held that a pension plan enforceable at the individual level was
incorporated into a collective agreement under a clause requiring the employer "to
continue his support" of the scheme. This implies that the obligation may be
incorporated from the collective agreement into the employment contract.
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lack of enforcement machinery, unless the court is prepared to
assume the functions of the arbitrator, with the unfortunate
consequences which, that entails. The fact that the provisions of the
collective agreement become contractual terms does not in reality
make them any less provisions of a collective agreement. 153 Even if
the procedures are incorporated, if the employer refuses to comply
with an arbitration award of reinstatement the grievor's only remedy
in court may be damages for breach of contract.
The arbitratorunderthe incorporation theory presumably derives his
powers from the employment contract, not from the labour relations
statute, so that his awards would be enforceable through the contract
rather than as orders of the court. It is a nice question whether the
court would order specific performance of an arbitration award to
reinstate an employee when to do so would result in specific
performance of an employment contract. Indeed, it is questionable
whether an arbitrator deriving his authority from an employment
contract would consider he could make an award of reinstatement in
the first place!
A third point arising from Zwelling is that the incorporation
theory could be thought to protect an employee although a second
collective agreement is concluded which does not expressly
preserve his benefits under the first agreement during the interval
between them. An arbitrator under the second collective agreement
would have no jurisdiction to enforce provisions of the earlier
agreement unless the second agreement expressly provided that the
provisions of the first agreement were to remain in force during the
hiatus, 15 4 although under the incorporation theory the provisions of
the first agreement would be enforceable through an action on the
employment contract. Of course, if the second agreement
retroactively "gutted" some or all provisions of the first agreement,
the second agreement would supercede any incorporated contractual
terms during its retroactivity period. However, supposing a lawful
strike or lockout occurred before a second agreement were reached,
the incorporation theory would only protect the employees' benefits
up to the date the strike or lockout began, unless employment
contracts were suspended for the duration of the industrial action.
Although the labour relations legislation preserves "employee"
status in this situation, it arguably does so only for the purposes of
153. Denis v. Gahvay Realty, C.F. Ferguson, supra, note 94
154. Re U.S.W. and Int'l Nickel Ltd. (1970), 22 L.A.C. 286 (Weatherhill)
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rights under the legislation, and incorporation is not a statutory
right. 15 5 It is therefore for the court to develop a common law
suspension doctrine, but previous decisions in Canada and England
suggest that this is extremely unlikely. The statute does protect
employees fully in respect to pension rights and benefits where the
employer purports to penalize them for striking, so that the
incorporation theory is otiose. However, in respect to other terms
and conditions of employment, because the Trade Union Act
provides 156 protection against discrimination for union activities
strikers are not protected where everyone is penalized, so there may
be a role for the incorporation theory in that situation. It is submitted
that, rather than protect strikers by the incorporation theory, the
statute should be amended by the substitution of the word
"penalize" for "discriminate" as this is more in line with the
philosophy of the statutory collective bargaining regime.
Although work must obviously continue on some terms after the
expiry of the collective agreement and the statutory "freeze", it is
submitted that the incorporation theory is an inappropriate device
for settling those terms. It injects an alien common law element with
a host of legal uncertainties into a statutory framework whose
philosophy is to outlaw the common law. 157 Even during the period
between two collective agreements the statute requires the parties to
bargain in good faith and the union remains the exclusive bargaining
agent. It is consistent with this statutory framework that the problem
of what happens to employment terms during the hiatus be resolved
by a statutory "bridging" provision. Section 44(2) of the Ontario
Labour Relations Act provides,
• . . the parties may, in a collective agreement or otherwise and
before or after the collective agreement has ceased to operate,
agree to continue the operation of the collective agreement or
any of its provisions for a period of less than one year while they
are bargaining for its renewal with or without modifications or
for a new agreement, but such continued operation does not bar
an application for certification or for a declaration that the trade
union no longer represents the employees in the bargaining unit
and the continuation of the collective agreement may be
terminated by either party upon thirty days notice to the other
party.
155. Nova Scotia Trade Union Act, 2. 12(2). c.f. ReAllanson (1971), 20 D.L.R.
(3d) 49 at 57 (per Arnup J.A.) (Ont. C.A.)
156. S. 51(3) (a) of the Nova Scotia Trade Union Act
157. See Royal York, supra, note 130 and A hiscough, supra, note 132
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One problem with this approach is that, if the parties do not remove
the peace obligation article, they must give thirty days' notice
before industrial action can be taken, which may hamper their
bargaining power in certain situations. Another drawback is the
"contracting-in" philosophy; namely, that the parties appear to
have to make some positive agreement. The word "otherwise" has
not received judicial attention as yet, so that it is unknown whether
the fact of continuing work without a positive agreement will
suffice. It is preferable that a "contracting-out" philosophy be
adopted whereby the collective agreement is presumed to continue,
except for the peace obligation, unless both parties expressly agree
to terminate it or modify its provisions. 158 The government of Nova
Scotia should consider seriously introducing a statutory "bridging"
provision of this kind.
Arbitration
Compared to Ontario and Alberta, there is not a great deal of
activity in the arbitration area in Nova Scotia. Over the past year,
however, arbitration under collective agreements has been subject
to a greater degree of judicial scrutiny than has hitherto been the
case. In particular, the decisions of the Appellate Division in
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 720 v. Volvo Canada
Ltd. 15 9 and the Trial Division in Bowater Mersey PaperCompany
Ltd. v. Canadian Paperworkers Union, Salaried Workers, Local
243160 are of great significance in respect of their impact on
consensual arbitrators. Moreover, the very recent decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Newfoundland Association of Public
Employees v. AIG 16 1 has some extremely interesting comments in
the area of the arbitrator's residual authority which may be of
158. In the construction industry in Alberta, the collective agreement must
terminate either on the date a strike or lockout commences or on the date a second
agreement is concluded, whichever occurs first. Alberta Labour Act, R.S.A. 1973,
c. 33, s. 89.

159. S.H. No. 08384, dated January 4, 1977. See also Melanson v. The Board of
School Commissioners of the City of Halifax, S.H. No. 11790, dated April 18,

1977, for a discussion of consensual and statutory arbitrators, and Hawker Siddley
CanadaLtd. v. Industrial Union Marine and Shipbuilding Worders, Locals I and

13, S.H. No. 13886, dated April 18, 1977, for a more realistic approach to
arbitrations.
160. S.H. No. 13092, dated February 18, 1977
161. Dated May 17, 1977
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interest to those in Nova Scotia.
In the Volvo CanadaLtd 16 2 case, the appellant union had referred
a grievance to the arbitrator under the collective agreement to
determine whether or not employees of the respondent company had
accumulated seniority with respect to holiday pay while they were
involved in a lawful strike. The arbitrator concluded that such
seniority had not been accumulated under the collective agreement.
In reaching his conclusion, he took into account a back to work
163
agreement made in 1969 following a strike. At Trial Division,
MacIntosh J. had dismissed the application to set aside the award
under The Arbitration Act. On appeal, the Appellate Division
upheld the union position and the award was quashed.
Three judgments were presented in the Appellate Division.
MacKeigan C.J. N.S. began with an analysis of the very difficult
arbitral question; namely, the role of judicial review of a consensual
arbitrator when he has decided the very point of law put to him for
his determination. As pointed out in this Law Journal recently, 16 4 in
theory a court should not review an arbitrator's consensual decision
on that "very question"' 165 in the same way they review the
decision of a statutory decision maker. The parties have agreed to
place the matter before him and should be bound to accept his
findings. It was also pointed out, however, that the Nova Scotia
courts had not developed any real jurisprudence in this area and that
perhaps the scope of the "very question" doctrine was being
narrowed.
In Volvo, MacKeigan C.J.N.S. closed somewhat the difference
between the consensual and statutory arbitrator. The Chief Justice
initially appeared to accept the full doctrine as it is currently
accepted by emphasizing the difficulty of review on the very
question, although his Lordship stressed that the court may still
intervene if the arbitrator has committed a jurisdictional error or
misconducted himself in a procedural sense in reaching his
decision.
The above statement should be qualified in the important respect,
that where a question of law is the very thing referred to
arbitration, in this case the legal construction and meaning of
162. S.H. No. 08384
163. S.H. No. 10972
164. (1976), 2 Dal. L.J. 791 at 850.
165. Kelantan Government v. Duff Development Company, [1923] A.C. 359 at
409 (H.C.)
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clauses in the agreement, the decision of the arbitrator on that
very point cannot be set aside merely or only because the Court
disagrees with that decision:...
This rule that an arbitral decision on a pure question of law is
immune from direct attack is merely an aspect of the broader
principle that no arbitral award is reviewable as to its correctness
on the very question referred to arbitration - whether that
question is one of fact, one of law or one of mixed law and fact.
Judicial review to detect "misconduct" must be as to things done
or omitted, or decisions made by an arbitrator in the course of
reaching his final award or decision on the very matter decided.
That kind of review, including search for possible serious errors
of law in the ancillary matters, is open66 even though the 'very
thing' submitted was a question of law. 1
Thus MacKeigan C.J.N.S. was at this stage still preserving the
"very question" doctrine while placing some restrictions on the
arbitrator's collateral jurisdiction. Later in his judgement, however,
the Chief Justice offered an opinion which, taken literally, could
spell the end of the doctrine.
I should add that in addition to the collateral attack which may be
made on awards where only questions of law are involved, the
Kelantan principle is further qualified, and a direct attack is
probably permitted, where a gross error has occurred in deciding
the very question referred and where, in construing the clauses in
the collective agreement which have been referred for interpretaone which the language
tion, the arbitrator's interpretation is not
167
of the clauses will reasonably bear:...
This view was not, apparently, shared by other members of the
Court. Coffin J.A., while agreeing with the Chief Justice that the
appeal should be allowed, did not comment on this point. 168 On the
other hand, Cooper J.A., dissenting, was very clearly of the view
that a specific question of law had been referred to the arbitrator and
that the only way the decision could be quashed would be if the
69
arbitrator had proceeded illegally in reaching his decision. '
It is the writers' opinion that MacKeigan C.J. is wrong in his
assessment of the court's review power. The cases he cites as
authority for his proposition are hardly supportive. We have
struggled unsuccessfully to find much of relevance in International
Association of Machinists v. Hudson Bay Mining and Smelting Co.
166. S.H. No. 08384 at 3-4
167. Id. at 6

168. Id. at28
169. Id. at20
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Ltd. 170 Moreover, while it is true that the reasonability of an
arbitrator's decision was discussed in Regina v. Barber, ex parte
Warehousemen and MiscellaneousDrivers' Union, 171 that decision
and the page references given by the Chief Justice involved

statutory arbitrators. It may be that some authority for his comments
may be found in the CanadianKeyes Fibre172 case, but even here it
is not clear whether the Nova Scotia Court was referring directly to
the "very question" principle.
A brief look once again at the Supreme Court of Canada decision
in the MetropolitanToronto PoliceAssociation v. The Metropolitan
Toronto Board of Commissioners of Police173 is pertinent. There,
the majority found that it was not a case where the "very question"
doctrine would protect a consensual arbitrator:
In my opinion, the present case is not one in which the parties by
agreement 'ousted the jurisdiction of the Courts to determine a
question of law by choosing to have the question determined by a
judge of their own making.' The question of law which arose in
the arbitration came up in the course of a consideration of a
grievance in the ordinary way under the provisions of the
collective agreement.
There was here no joint submission by the parties to the
arbitrator, seeking to have a specific question of law determined
for them

. .

. [The] issue came before the arbitrator by virtue of

the provisions of the collective agreement governing the
processing of all grievances. Its solution certainly involved a
consideration of the construction of the agreement, but the
submission to the arbitrator was to be determined on the basis of
the true meaning of the agreement. The parties had not bound
themselves to an unqualified acceptance
of the arbitrator's
74
decision as to what the agreement meant. 1
As has been commented, this decision definitely had the effect of
narrowing the "very question" doctrine but only in the sense of
when it applied. We feel that it is abundantly clear from this passage
that when a specific question is referred to the arbitrator, that
question cannot be reviewed by the Courts. The parties have bound
themselves to an "unqualified acceptance" of the arbitrator's
decision.
We are not surprised at the Chief Justice's approach. His
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

[19681S.C.R. 113
[1968] 20.R. 245
[1974] 8 N.S.R. (2d) 81
[1975] S.C.R. 630; 45 D.L.R. (3d) 548
Id. at 657; 45 D.L.R. (3d) at 568
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Lordship's attitude in the Schwartz case, particularly his comments
on what constitutes an unfair labour practice, indicated some
reluctance to accept any autonomy for supposedly expert tribunals
and boards. 175 Nevertheless, MacKeigan C.J.N.S. has come close
in the Volvo case to eliminating completely any distinction between
statutory arbitrators in Ontario and Prince Edward Island and the
consensual counterpart in Nova Scotia. In so doing, His Lordship
has come as close as any judge to admitting that the basis for review
is whether or not the arbitrator's decision crosses the Court's
"threshold of shock". Hopefully, the dissenting judgment of
Cooper J.A. will be followed if the point arises before the Appellate
Division in the future.
Aside from the Chief Justice's discussion of judicial review we
have few critical comments on his decision. In fact, MacKeigan
C.J.N.S. shows a genuine appreciation of the problems and
interests of unionized employees engaged in a lawful strike. The
issue was whether seniority for holiday pay accumulated during
such a strike under the collective agreement. The relevant
provisions of that agreement were:
19.04 Subject to the provisions of Article 19.05, an employee is
qualified to receive pay for the above holidays if he has attained
seniority through completion of his probationary period and he
has worked seven (7) hours on the work day immediately prior
to, and seven (7) hours on the day after, each of the above-named
holidays. Absence from work for reasonable cause on the day
before or after the holiday will be counted as time worked in
qualifying for holiday pay...
19.05 In no case shall the number of consecutively paid holidays
(Christmas Holiday Period) exceed the number of full months of
accumulated seniority attained on the day prior to commencement of said consecutively occurring holidays...
9.01 For the purpose of this agreement and unless otherwise
stipulated herein, 'seniority' means the length of service in the
bargaining unit.
25.03 For the purposes of this agreement, the word 'service'
includes any period of time during which an employee
accumulates seniority as well as any period of employment with
the Company in any capacity whatsoever.
9.02 Seniority of an employee shall not count until he has
completed an accumulated period of thirty-eight (38) days
worked in the employ of the Company.
175. See (1976), 2 Dal. L.J. 791 at 810-811
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9.04 Whenever an employee with acquired seniority rights is
away from work on a leave of absence or because of a
disciplinary suspension or illness or injury or any other justifiable
reason, his seniority shall accumulate during such absence,
unless otherwise stipulated within the present agreement.
9.05 Whenever an employee is laid off, his seniority continues to
accumulate during such period of time that his name appears on
the recall list.
9.06 Whenever an employee is transferred out of the bargaining
unit, his seniority continues to accumulate during a period of
twenty-four (24) consecutive months, after which his seniority is
maintained but does not accumulate...
The arbitrator was asked to interpret articles 9.01, 25.03, 9.02
and 9.04 to 9.06 inclusive. He concluded that seniority accumulated
only in the circumstances specified in articles 9.04, 9.05 and 9.06,
and that, since absence because of a strike was not specifically
enumerated as one of those reasons, employees on strike did not
accumulate seniority. In reaching this conclusion, the arbitrator
placed great weight on the fact that there had been no back to work
agreement, unlike the one negotiated in 1969, which specifically
dealt with the status of striking workers.
MacKeigan C.J.N.S. held that the arbitrator was wrong and had
not asked himself the proper question. First, His Lordship
concluded that the back to work agreement of 1969 had been
wrongly admitted into evidence since it was not used to resolve any
ambiguity, patent or latent, in the agreement.
No specific ambiguity in any word, phrase or clause was
involved in the inference drawn from the 1969 agreement by the
arbitrator. None has been identified which use of that agreement
could resolve. No extrinsic evidence is required to resolve any
ambiguity, patent or latent, including the kind of latent ambiguity
where words or phrases have been used in a special sense or
applied to special circumstances, making their application to the
facts uncertain or difficult without extrinsic explanation of the
parties' intent. 176
Second, and more importantly, the Chief Justice found that the
arbitrator had not asked the appropriate question which was whether
absence in a lawful strike constituted a "justifiable reason" within
article 9.04.177 Alternatively, His Lordship held that to overlook
that question would be to place on the language of the clauses of the
176. S.H. No. 08384 at 15
177. Id. at 10
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agreement an interpretation they could not reasonably bear. 78
MacKeigan C.J.N.S. concluded that seniority did accumulate
during a lawful strike. His Lordship pointed out that the Nova
Scotia Trade Union Act guaranteed the continuance of employee
status while on a lawful strike. It was also pointed out that section
51(3) protects accrued and vested pension benefits. However, it was
not necessary to decide whether seniority for holiday purposes
amounted to accrued benefits on this occasion since there was a
collective agreement in force which governed the position. In our
view, section 51(3) would not include seniority rights. The wording
of the section, "any pension rights or accrued benefits" would
appear to be aimed at only pension benefits. Thus, pension rights
refers to vested benefits and accrued benefits to those pension
benefits which have not yet vested. In Nova Scotia, it would seem
that the seniority of strikers is only protected by the general unfair
labour practices. 179
His Lordship then proceeded to decide that where a collective
agreement is made retroactive, all rights and benefits under that
agreement, including seniority, must prima facie be treated as
having continued to accrue during the retroactive period. To some
extent, this bald statement of continuing rights under the collective
agreement tends to beg the question since it does not decide whether
seniority for holiday pay during a lawful strike was dealt with in the
agreement. In an extremely perceptive argument, however,
MacKeigan C.J.N.S. dealt with this problem. He pointed out that
seniority is one of the most important benefits for any trade union
member and one which may affect many aspects of his life.
Accordingly, any attempt to take away seniority must be made in
very clear language, particularly where the only rationale for so
doing was participation in a lawful strike. In the absence of such
wording, the Chief Justice found that involvement in a lawful strike
must be a "justifiable reason" for being absent from work within
article 9.04. Thus, seniority did accumulate during the strike. 180
We agree with this analysis. MacKeigan C.J.N.S.' approach is
certainly consistent with previous arbitration decisions' 8 1 and
178. Id. at 11
179. See England, The Legal Response to Striking at the Individual Level in the
Common Law Jurisdictionsin Canada (1976), 3 Dal. L.J. 440 at 460
180. S.H. No. 08384 at 13
181. Re United Electrical Workers, Local 512, v. Tung-Sol of Canada Ltd.
(1964), 15 L.A.C. 161 (Reville, Co. Ct. J.), cited by MacKeigan C.J.
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academic commentaries. 182 It is also in accord with the philosophy
of the Trade Union Act which is that those involved in a lawful
strike should not have vested or accrued benefits affected by their
participation. The question of seniority may not be specifically dealt
with under the Act but the Act does encourage the lawful strike as a
legitimate weapon in industrial relations and in our view any
attempt to provide adverse consequences for such action must be
clear and unambiguous.
The remaining two judgments do not contain much worthy of
detailed comment. As stated, Cooper J.A. dissenting, found that
since a specific question had been referred to the arbitrator, his
response could only be reviewed if the arbitrator had proceeded to
his conclusion illegally. In fact His Lordship found that while there
was no patent ambiguity, there was a latent ambiguity in that there
was uncertainty and difficulty in the application of the articles of the
collective agreement to the factual situation. Thus, the arbitrator
had admitted the 1969 agreement properly and his decision could
not be reviewed. 18 3 Coffin J.A. concurred with Cooper J.A. in
holding that the agreement was ambiguous. However, he agreed
with MacKeigan C.J.N.S. that the arbitrator had failed to answer
the proper question, viz, whether the absence from work on a legal
strike constituted "other justifiable error" within article 9.04.
84
Accordingly, he found the arbitrator to be in error. 1
The repercussions of MacKeigan C.J.N.S.' approach as to
review of arbitration boards soon became apparent. In Bowater
Mersey PaperCo. Ltd. v. CanadianPaperworkersUnion, Salaried
Workers, Local 243, 185 Cowan C.J. had to deal with yet another
application to set aside an arbitration award. The appellant
employer had transferred an employee from the position of
switchboard operator to that of office messenger. The union claimed
in a grievance that the employee had breached section 4 of the
collective agreement dealing with management rights which reads:
The Management of the Company and the direction of the
working forces, including (but not by way of limitation), the size
of the work force, the right to hire, promote, suspend, discharge,
transfer, lay-off because of lack of work, and discipline
employees for cause; the right to decide the number and location
182.
183.
Co.,
184.
185.

England, supra
S.H. No. 08384 at 21-24. See Leitch GoldMines Ltd. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
[1969] 1 O.R. 469 at 523-24 (per Gale C.J.O.) cited by Cooper J.A. at 22
Id. at28
S.H. No. 13092
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of departments, products to be manufactured, methods and
schedules of production, and means and processes of manufacturing are vested solely in the Management; provided that none of
these functions of Management shall be exercised so as to
abrogate any specific provision of this Agreement or to
discriminate against the Union or any employee.
The employer's rationale for the transfer was that a number of
complaints had been received about the switchboard and that, while
there was insufficient evidence to discipline the employee, some
blame could be attached to the latter and she should be transferred.
No demotion was involved and, in fact, the employer testified that
some benefit would accrue to the employee. The Arbitration Board
decided on the evidence that none of the inadequacies or complaints
of the switchboard operations could be attributed to the incompetence of the employee. Moreover, the Board found that, in light of
past company practice, the employer had improperly transferred the
employee.
The Board then found that the company was attempting to do
indirectly, that which it could not have done directly. It stated that
the company realized that it would not be able to justify the
discharge of the griever on grounds of incompetence and sought to
move the griever out of her position using the complaints, which
had not been investigated, as the reason for the move, justifying it
on the basis of the right of management to promote and transfer
employees.
In addition, the Board found that the employer had discriminated
against the employee within section 4. Placing a broad interpretation on 'discriminatory', the Board held that while the transfer could
not be described as 'injurious', it was 'unfair to the grievor'. The
company in the past had allowed employees to refuse promotions or
transfers except in 'extraordinary circumstances'. Since there were
no special considerations in the present case in the opinion of the
Board:
It follows that to require her to accept the promotion in these
circumstances creates unfair treatment to this employee in the
face of the application of the principle in other promotion
situations which the evidence leads one to conclude have existed
between this company and this union. This amounts to the kind of
unfair treatment that falls within the exception in Section 4 of the
collective agreement, described by the rather harsh expression as
discrimination against the employee (herein the grievor). 18 6
186. Id. at 9
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Given these findings, the Arbitration Board upheld the employee's
grievance and declared the transfer void.
Cowan C. J. quashed the award. His Lordship commenced by
restating what he felt was the general rule; namely, that a
management rights clause gives the company the right to transfer
and promote employees without qualification or reservation. After
citing passages from MacKeigan C.J.N.S.' decision in the Volvo
case, 187 his Lordship found two errors in the arbitrator's decision.
First, he found that to read section 4 as saying that the employer was
guilty of discrimination if it did not permit an employee to refuse a
transfer which amounted to a promotion was to place a construction
on the clause which it could not reasonably bear. 18 8 Second he
found that the Board was in error in finding that there was no
extraordinary considerations in the case of the grievor, and in
finding that the company was bound to apply its general policy of
allowing employees to refuse promotions if the Board found there
was no extraordinary considerations on the evidence.1 89 In short,
His Lordship concluded that the policy of the company was purely a
matter for the latter's consideration and could be changed from time
to time, so long as there was no transgressing of the discrimination
clause in article 4. Since, on this interpretation, the company view
as to 'extraordinary circumstances' was decisive, there was no
ambiguity in the collective agreement and the evidence of past
practice was illegally entered. As a final point, Cowan C.J. held
that in interpreting the word "discriminate" to include "unfairness" the Arbitration Board had not been reasonable. 190
In our view there is very little to be complimentary about in the
Bowater case. Cowan C.J. would seem to have not only placed an
incorrect interpretation on the collective agreement but also
intervened unnecessarily with the arbitral award. First, we are
concerned about the Chief Justice's interpretation of the breadth of
the management rights clause. Even assuming that as a general rule
management rights are unfettered, clearly in the present case those
rights were subject to the discrimination clause. The question as to
whether there had been discrimination was therefore a question for
the Board. How, then, can Cowan C.J.'s statement that
"extraordinary circumstances" are purely a matter for management
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 12-14
Id. at 14
Id. at 15
Id. at 17
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be correct? Certainly, management may change their policy at any
time, but subject to the discriminatory prohibition. If the
Arbitration Board is to decide whether there has been discrimination
or not they must evaluate to some extent the management rationale
for the impugned transaction. To disallow this jurisdiction would be
to render the "discrimination" clause meaningless. Moreover, if
this argument were carried to its logical conclusion, the "just
cause" provision of collective agreements should be interpreted in
the same way; the management assessment of what constitutes "just
cause" would be determinative and the arbitrator could not
challenge or assess the company's belief.
Moreover, we feel that in ruling the evidence of company past
practice inadmissable, the Chief Justice was incorrect. His Lordship
concluded that since there was no ambiguity, evidence of past
practice could not be permitted. But we are not concerned with
ambiguity. Surely the word "discriminate" implicitly incorporates
past practice into the collective agreement. Otherwise, how can the
arbitration Board decide whether discrimination has taken place?
There must be something with which the employer's action can be
compared. The situation is similar to discipline cases where
arbitrators have looked at the employer action in the past to
determine whether the same penalty is being levied on similar
offences. 191 No one, to our knowledge, has argued inadmissability
of past practice evidence here. If one were not to permit evidence of
an employer's past practice, the only time you could have
discrimination is if two or more employees were simultaneously
treated in a different manner. This cannot be the effect of such a
clause.
19 1. Re InternationalAssociation of Machinists,Lodge 1703 and Perfect Circle Victor Division, VNG Auto PartsLtd. (1972), 24 L.A.C. 380 at 382 (Weiler):
I would be remiss if I left the matter simply at that. There is a real issue of
substance behind the technical objection of the company and I should deal with
the opposing arguments on their respective merits. In the first place, despite the
company suggestion to the contrary, the evidence as to the absenteeism records
of other employees is very relevant. Whether the legal standard for reviewing
discipline be its reasonability, justice, equity, uniformity, etc., the particular
case cannot be considered in a vacuum. There must be factors which justify
singling out one employee for the distinctive treatment of discipline. A key
criterion in this regard is the treatment customarily meted out to other
employees in the plant for like behaviour, and undue discrimination between
employees will be grounds for overturning the more severe discipline imposed
on one of them.
See also International Nickel Co. of Canada Ltd. (1974), 7 L.A.C. (2d) 443
(Palmer); Robson Lang (London) Ltd. (1965), 16 L.A.C. 1"45 (Reville)
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Secondly, one wonders whether Cowan C.J.'s intervention in
holding that the Arbitration Board's reading of the collective
agreement was not reasonable is justifiable. Regardless of whether
or not the Arbitration Board was correct in its interpretation, in our
view it was a reasonable interpretation, one that is justified on one
reading of the collective agreement. If an employer transfers X
when no one else has ever been transferred in the past and the
arbitrator does not accept the employer's rationale for that action, is
it not reasonable to say that X has been discriminated against? A
court may not agree with the conclusion on the facts or as a matter
of interpretation as to what the collective agreement means, but this
should not give them a basis for intervention. Thus, it may be that
the word 'discriminate' was intended to mean something more than
"unfair" and that at least it incorporates an element of intent to
harm. However, the point is that the meaning 'unfair' is not an
unreasonable interpretation of the word. There is no gross error.
The traditional rule has always been that a court will not interfere
with an arbitrator's decision unless the latter's decision could not
reasonably have been reached. In our view, this was not the case in
the Bowater decision and Cowan C.J.'s judgment represents an
undesirable opening up of the arbitration format in the resolution of
collective agreement disputes and an unfortunate application of
even more unfortunate dicta from the Volvo case.
One final note on the Bowater case: we are not sure whether
Cowan C.J. is correct in saying that prina facie a management
rights clause gives the employer complete freedom. Recently, some
authority has developed which makes it clear that management
rights do not give the employer a complete discretion. That
discretion must be exercised in a manner that is reasonable in all
192 it
circumstances. Previously, as demonstrated in the KVP case,
appeared that this reasonable standard was limited to rules
unilaterally introduced by the company. More recently, we feel this
has been extended in the INCO v. U.S.W.A. decision. 19 3 At issue
here was the reasonableness of the company's-action in refusing a
leave of absence to a jailed employee but the following passage
illustrates the broad philosophy behind the Board decision:
In our view the requirement of The Labour Relations Act to
'further harmonious relations between employers and employees'
192. K.V.P. Co. Ltd. (1965), 16L.A.C. 73 (Robinson
193. LabourArbitrationNews, April 1977, Vol. 13, No. 4 at I
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as well as the requirement to bargain in good faith, (which ought
to transcend the signing of the document) requires an objective
standard of collective agreement interpretation, and places the
union as the collective bargaining agent for the employees on an
equal basis with the employer for the purpose of defining the
relationships under the collective agreement. Harmonious
relationships are not developed by subordinating one of the
parties to the agreement to the other, and it is in that context and
on that premise that assumptions, if any, are to be made. It is for
those reasons that we hold that the company's discretionary right
to grant a leave of absence must be exercised on a rational or
reasonably objective basis, rather than on the premise that there is
in the collective agreement an internally implied management's
rights theory which results in granting to management a complete
discretion in matters which it is compelled to administer. 194
Previous to this decision, Laskin C.J. in a dissenting judgment in
the Supreme Court of Canada case of Winnipeg Builders'
Exchange' 9 5 had voiced similar sentiments. There is also other
arbitral authority to the same effect.1 96 What these cases strongly
suggest is that the collective agreement, and all its provisions,
including the management rights clause, be read subject to the
implied term that they be exercised reasonably. One wonders
whether, on the present facts, management would have been found
to have acted reasonably in transferring the employee - perhaps
not. Nevertheless, Cowan C.J.'s assessment of the power under
management rights clauses stands in stark contrast to the recent
trend of putting union and management on a similar footing under
the collective agreement by requiring both to act reasonably.
Accordingly, its accuracy must be in some doubt.
All labour lawyers will remember the Supreme Court of Canada
decision in the Port Arthur Shipbuilding197 case. In that case, the

arbitrator had found that there were grounds for discipline but that
discharge was too onerous a penalty. Accordingly, he had
substituted a penalty. The Supreme Court of Canada concluded the
arbitrator had exceeded his jurisdiction by usurping the rights of
management and amending the collective agreement. Once he had
found cause for discipline, he had no power to change the penalty.
194. Id. at3
195. [1975] CLLC 14, 299 at 15380
196. See Re Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers & Polymer Corp. (1958), 10
L.A.C. 31 (Laskin, Q.C.) where a duty of reasonableness was imposed on union
officials.
197. [1969] S.C.R. 85
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Inevitably, the labour legislation in most provinces, including Nova
Scotia,' 98 was amended to reverse the Port Arthur Shipbuilding
case. Nevertheless, Newfoundland has still not taken this step and
some comments from the Supreme Court of Canada in The
Newfoundland Association of Public Employees v. A.G. Newfoundland'9 9 will be of interest in that province. In a broader
perspective, this decision is interesting in that it is indicative
perhaps of a changing attitude in the Supreme Court of Canada as to
the role of courts in the field of arbitration. 200 In this context, it may
be that the Court's development will parallel recent legislative
amendments aimed at restricting judicial intervention.
In the Newfoundland Association of Public Employees case,
several civil servants had been discharged for maltreating children
in a special-care home. In upholding the discharge of several of the
employees, the Arbitration Board stated that it had no jurisdiction to
vary the penalty because of the PortArthur Shipbuilding case. The
case was ultimately appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada on the
basis that the Board was mistaken as to its power to substitute a
lesser penalty.
In the majority judgment, Spence J. ruled that since the matter
had not been raised before the Arbitration Board, the appeal could
not be decided. His Lordship expressly refused to discuss the Port
Arthur Shipbuilding case, but did indicate that otherwise the
Supreme Court would possibly have had to reconsider the earlier
decision. 20 ' It is in Laskin C.J.'s decision that the extensive
discussion is contained. The Chief Justice agreed with Spence J.
that the question of arbitral powers did not have to be decided in the
present case but gave a much stronger indication that the time might
well have come to reverse the decision in PortArthur Shipbuilding,
in recognition of the power an arbitrator should have to dispose of
grievances effectively:
• . . Nonetheless, I would not leave this case without saying that
the issue dealt with in the Port Arthur Shipbuilding case might,
on an appropriate occasion, be reconsidered by the full Court.
Subject, of course, to particular collective agreement provisions
which lead in another direction, I am of the opinion that an
198. S.N.S. 1972, c. 19, s. 41(d)
199. May 17, 1977
200. See Weiler, The Slippery Slope ofJudicialIntervention (1971), 9 O.H.L.J. 1.
Compare Steinberg, The Remedial Authority of the Labour Arbitrator: A
Postscript. (1977), 15 O.H.L.J. 251
201. May 17, 1977 at8
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arbitration board empowered to consider and decide whether a
discharge is for just cause may as part of its remedial authority,
unless expressly precluded by the collective agreement or by
statute, properly decide that the cause assigned for discharge did
not justify such a penalty but did merit some other form of
discipline.
Cause and penalty are intertwined, especially in discharge
cases. I hold the view that arbitration boards, as domestic
tribunals of the parties, should be given latitude, no less than that
given by Court decisions to statutory governmental tribunals, to
exercise their powers so as best to effectuate their raison d'tre
It is in the sense of the recognition of the necessary power of a
board of arbitration, under commonly prescribed arbitration
clauses, to effectively dispose of grievances justly, as the board
sees the matter after a hearing, that this Court's decision in the
Polymer case (sub nom Inbleau v. Laskin (1962), S.C.R. 338),
urged here by the appellant, takes on significance. 202
Readers should not forget that Laskin C.J. does make his
comments subject to terms of the collective agreement. Thus, where
special penalties are provided, the arbitrator is bound to apply them.
It should also be borne in mind that Laskin C.J.'s comments are
generally restricted to the arbitrator's powers in imposing penalties
in discipline cases. However, the Chief Justice's reference to the
Polymer decision and the need for some power "to effectively
dispose of grievances justly" may be indicative of an intention to
reconsider at some time the broader philosophy of the arbitrator's
remedial jurisdiction. Thus in the future we may see such problems
as mandatory time limits, rectification, laches and estoppel being
looked at by at least some members of the Supreme Court in a
manner that recognizes the necessary powers an arbitrator must
have to function effectively as an interpreter of the collective
agreement.
Strikes -National Day of Protest
In the writers' knowledge there have been no developments in Nova
Scotia or in the Supreme Court of Canada in the general area of
timely or untimely strikes. The introduction of the federal
government's Wage and Price Guidelines and the response of the
Canadian Labour Congress did, however, provide the environment
for collective action of a sort that Canadian courts had not hitherto
202. Id. at 5-7
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been called upon to deal with. During 1976, the Canadian Labour
Congress (C.L.C.) announced its plans for a National Day of
Protest against the federal anti-inflation programme. The date set
was October 14, 1976, and it was hoped that a nation-wide work
stoppage would convince the federal government of the seriousness
of the Canadian Labour Congress' opposition to the programme.
Not surprisingly, the legality of the work stoppages was tested in a
203
number of cases.
In Bowater Mersey Paper Comp v. Canadian Paperworkers,
Local 141,204 the Nova Scotia Supreme Court had occasion to
consider the problem. The company intended to commence an
action subsequently to recover damages for monies lost as a result of
Local 141 participating in the National Day of Protest. At this stage,
however, it was seeking an injunction to prevent what would be, in
its opinion, a strike contrary to the Trade Union Act and a stoppage
of work contrary to the collective agreement.
Counsel for the Local argued that the strike was not contrary to
the Trade Union Act because the definition of strike in the Act was
not wide enough to encompass the stoppage in the Day of Protest.
Section l(v) reads:
(v) "strike" includes a cessation of work, or refusal to work or
continue to work, by employees, in combination or in concert or
in accordance with a common understanding, for the purpose of
compelling their employer to agree to terms or conditions of
employment or to aid other employees in compelling their
employer to agree to terms or conditions of employment; and
"to strike" has a corresponding meaning;
It was claimed by the Local that "strikes" must be designed to
203. As indicated, we are not discussing those cases involving the Anti-Inflation
Regulations and the collective agreement. However, for reference purposes the
following cases have arisen in this area: TransportLabour Relations and General
Truck Drivers and Helpers' Union, [1976] 2 C.L.R.B. Rep. 372 (B.C.L.R.B.);
Health Employees'

Union, Local No.

180 and Health Labour Relations

Association, [1976] 2 C.L.R.B. Rep. 388 (B.C.L.R.B.); United Steelworkers of
America, Local 13704 v. Canadian Industries Ltd., [1976] CLLC 16014
(O.L.R.B.); British Columbia Institute of Technology v. British Columbia
Government Employees Union, [ 1976] CLLC 16019; Manitoba ForestryResources
Ltd. v. CanadianPaper Workers Union, Local 1403, [1977] 1 C.L.R.B. Rep. I l1
(M.L.R.B.); Cyprus Anvil Mining Corporationv. UnitedSteelworkers of America,

Locals 1051 and 8243, [1976] CLLC 16104; 5 (C.L.R.B.) Joint Council of
Newspaper Unions and Pacific Press, [1976] CLLC, 16042 (B.C.L.R.B.);
Labourers' hIternational Union of North America, Local 607 and Mole

Construction, [1971] CLLC 16063 (O.L.R.B.).
204. Dated October 13, 1976
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compel or be for the purpose of compelling the employer to agree to
terms or conditions of employment. The action of October 14 was
completely outside the scope of the employment relationship and
was aimed at the Government, not the employer. Hart J. agreed
with this analysis:
When the legislation prohibits strikes and lockouts it refers to acts
done by either employees or employers in their attempt to bring
about changes in the working relationship between them and not
to actions taken in support or opposition to social causes not
related to their terms and conditions of employment. If for
instance, an employer wished to close its factory because it no
longer wished to produce goods that were damaging to the
environment, or if employees wished to withdraw their services
in protest of capital punishment they would not, in my opinion,
come within the Legislative prohibition2 05 against strikes or
lockouts contained in the Trade Union A ct.
Mr. Justice Hart therefore refused to issue an injunction.
The local also argued that although a breach of the collective
agreement would take place the Court had no jurisdiction to decide
the matter because the agreement provided for the settlement of
such disputes through final and binding arbitration, and it was
claimed that the latter was the appropriate forum to settle whether a
breach had taken place.
Hart J. rejected this argument. 206 His Lordship held that there
was a clear violation of the collective agreement since willfully
refusing to work for a full day in protest of a policy adopted by the
government was directly contrary to the union's obligation to ensure
continual employment and production. Hart J. also rejected the
Local's claim based on jurisdiction.
I have perused the grievance provisions of the collective
agreement and the provisions of section 40 of the Act and, in my
opinion, neither covers the situation where the union has
indicated its intention to openly defy its requirements under the
collective agreement. We are not considering here a question of a
difference of opinion between the parties as to the interpretation,
application or administration of the collective agreement, or the
resolution of a grievance which had validly arisen between an
employee and the company in the course of the administration of
the collective agreement. In this case we have been asked to
consider the union's expressed intention to defy the terms of its
collective agreement by interrupting the work of the plant on
205. Id. at 4

206. Id. at 7
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October 14, 1976 to protest a social cause.
I do not believe that under these circumstances there is any
requirement on the company to seek redress under the collective
agreement as it has not been designed to meet a situation such as
this. The company may pursue its remedy at common law to
of contract under which it could
prevent an anticipated breach
207
suffer irreparable harm.
Having reached this conclusion, Hart, J. granted the injunction. He
found that a chance of irreparable damage to the company was
present and in the absence of any justification for breach of the
collective agreement, the Court's discretion should be exercised in
20 8
favour of the company.
On first reading, this decision appears logical. On closer analysis,
however, there are at least two areas worthy of note. Two decisions
of the Labour Boards of Ontario and British Columbia have also
been handed down on this point. 209 Accordingly, it will be useful to
discuss the Nova Scotia decision in light of these two cases.
The decision of Hart J. on the breadth of the "strike" definition
would seem to be correct. It accords with the terminology of the
definition clause and despite the fact that the definition reads,
"'strike' includes", his Lordship's decision to read the clause as
exhaustive appears reasonable. His decision is also quite consistent
on this point with the decision of the British Columbia board in the
British Columbia Hydro case. 21 0 Here the Board found that since
the proposed action had a political rather than a collective
bargaining purpose it did not fit within the statutory definition of
strike which is basically the same as the Nova Scotia provision.
The major difference in the British Columbia and Nova Scotia
decisions is one of depth of reasoning. As one might expect, Paul
Weiler, the Chairman of the British Columbia Board, went into a
lengthy analysis of why the section should be read as exhaustive.
Weiler pointed out that while the Ontario definition is worded more
widely than the British Columbia provision, other provinces,
including Nova Scotia, have for a number of years maintained the
207. Id.
208. Id. at 8
209. Domglass Ltd. and United Glass and Ceramic Workers of North America,
[1976] CLLC 16050 (O.L.R.B.); British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority
and hIternational Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 258 and 213,
Amalgamated Trasit Union, Local 109 and Local 101-134 and Office and
Technical Employees Union, Local378, [1977] CLLC 16066 (B.C.L.R.B.).
210. Id.
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narrow definition. Accordingly, he held that it would be quite
undesirable for the Board to rewrite that definition and possibly
interpret it in a way contrary to the legislative intent:
Precisely the same definition is contained in the labour legislation
of Alberta, Manitoba, and Nova Scotia. In other words, all of
these Provinces, including British Columbia, have adopted and
acted upon a quite different theme in the definition of "strike" in
their legislation by contrast with the Ontario model. Thus it
would appear to be an unjustifiable act of legislation on the part
of this Board if we were, in effect, to re-write the statutory
definition of "strike" in our Labour Code, when that definition
has existed for so many years in our law, through so many
changes of government and labour law policy, and follows a
pattern adopted by several other Provinces as well. 211
Weiler then proceeded to point out that assuming there can be no
contracting out of the Act, in other words that the parties cannot
agree to permit a strike contrary to the prevailing labour legislation,
it would cause great industrial relations problems to adopt the wider
Ontario approach. 212 The Ontario model, he found, was too broad.
Since it catches any two employees when they refuse to do certain
work without regard to intent, it is impossible for the union or
employer to agree on hot-cargo clauses, refusals to cross picket
lines, or non-affiliation clauses. Such clauses, which are relatively
common in collective agreements and arguably valid under the
British Columbia or Nova Scotia Acts, would beprinafacieillegal
in Ontario. This argument, of course, has more force in British
Columbia where specific statutory provisions give the Labour Board
jurisdiction over such matters, but the analysis still has much
validity in Nova Scotia where it can be claimed that the strike clause
has been used in its narrower sense to allow the parties to reach
agreement in these areas. In the absence of express legislative
language indicating an intent to provide a guarantee against any
interruption of work during the course of the collective agreement,
Weiler refused to interpret the British Columbia decision more
broadly.
Finally, Weiler pointed out the obvious concern of the Board with
the political connotations of Board action in this area. Thus, for the
Board to take action in this area it would have to decide whether the
provincial legislation constituted an interference with political rights
211. Id. at 16433-16434
212. Id. at 16434
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or whether the National Day of Protest should not be characterized
as a political right at all but rather part of the labour relations
environment and thus capable of constitutional regulation in a
provincial labour relations statute. The British Columbia Board,
unlike its Ontario counterpart, did not decide this question.
However, it did point out that solving constitutional and political
problems was not the role of the Labour Relations Board. This was
particularly so where there was the probability that the National Day
of Protest was a once-and-for-all event:
When the problem is faced directly in that situation, we believe
that the Legislature would recognize that it is not essentially a
matter of collective bargaining law which is the concern of the
Labour Code. The Code deals with the entire range of
labour/management disputes and establishes this Board, broadly
representative of both labour and management, as the tribunal to
administer that body of law. By contrast, political work
stoppages involve disputes between unions and a government.
Neither the resources of the Code nor this Board have much,
if
213
anything, to contribute to the resolution of those problems.
As Weiler added, to force the Labour Board to decide contentious
issues such as these could only damage its ability to function
effectively as an accepted party in the labour relations area.
In the writers' view, the decision in British Columbia Hydro
succinctly explains why Mr. Justice Hart was correct in not giving
the strike clause in the Nova Scotia Act a wide interpretation.
Certainly the philosophy of Paul Weiler was not present in the
judgement in Bowater Mersey but it provides an underlying basis
for Hart J.'s decision which, in our view, makes both literal and
industrial relations sense.
The Nova Scotia and British Columbia cases might fruitfully be
compared with the decision of the Ontario Board in DonglassLtd.
v. United Glass and Ceramic Workers of North America. 2 14 The
Ontario Labour Relations Act defines "strike" somewhat more
widely than in Nova Scotia. "Strike" is defined in s.l(1) (n) as
including:
(n) a cessation of work, a refusal to work or to continue to work by
employees in combination or in concert or in accordance with a
common understanding, or a slow-down or other concerted
activity on the part of employees designed to restrict or limit
output
213. Id. at 16437
214. [1976]CLLC 16050
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There is no reference, as there is in Nova Scotia, to compelling the
employer to agree to terms and conditions of employment.
If read literally, this definition would cover any concerted work
stoppage, regardless of motivation or justification. The problem
posed before the Ontario Board was whether it should be read more
narrowly by importing the requirement that any action be carried out
for the purpose of obtaining concessions from the employer. To this
end it was argued by the union that since the Act itself dealt only
with terms and conditions of employment between employer and
union, so the definition of "strike" should be similarly construed.
The Board rejected this argument. 215 It stated that merely
because the dispute was between government and employees, it
could still have a profound effect on the employer-employee
relationship by disrupting the work programme. To adopt the
argument would mean that a fundamental obligation in the
collective agreement and the Act would not be protected so long as
the strike was politically motivated. The Board, in fact, added that a
literal construction of the definition was consistent with the Act.
The policy of the statute was to stop all disruptions of work during
the course of the collective agreement and the definition should be
construed in light of this policy. Its conclusion is succinctly stated in
the following passage:
All other strikes, including politically motivated strikes, have
been prohibited in order to keep to a minimum conduct disruptive
to production and harmful to general labour relations harmony.
The strike, in our view, was intended by the legislature to be only
a collective bargaining sanction, to be applied in a particular
labour relations situation, and to be used in no other context,
whether political or otherwise. 216
Accordingly, the Ontario Board decided that the work stoppage
on October 14 would constitute an illegal strike under the Act. We
have no problems with this response in that it represents a clear
restatement of the literal language of the definition clause, a clause,
moreover, which it can be strongly argued the legislature intended
to work more widely than its Nova Scotia equivalent. It is
interesting, however, to note that the Ontario Board did not grant a
direction to cease any intended collective action. It felt that as one
of the major questions before it was a fundamental constitutional
question involving the jurisdiction of provincial labour relations
215. Id. at 16343
216. Id. at 16344

Labour Law 465

legislation, it should exercise its powers carefully. Thus, while it
decided the provincial legislation was valid, if it were subsequently
overruled by the Courts its order would have the effect of interfering
with a basic political right. Accordingly, while it chose to provide
some relief, the remedy given was merely a declaration that in the
Board's opinion the stoppage would be an illegal strike. Coupled
with this was a warning that anyone involved in the stoppage would
face all the consequences of an illegal strike. 217 All we wish to say
is that this procedural terminology makes little practical difference.
In the long run, a penalty levied on persons for participating in
illegal strikes, which is struck down subsequently as being
unconstitutional is not better than an unconstitutional quia timet
direction.
While the writers are happy with the interpretation placed upon
the strike clause by Hart J. in the Bowater Mersey decision, the
same cannot be said about his treatment of the collective agreement.
It will be remembered that Hart J. granted an injunction based on
breach of the collective agreement because of the union's express
intention to defy its terms to protest a social cause. The collective
agreement (and presumably the arbitration process), it was held,
was not designed to meet an occasion like 'this and therefore his
2 18
Lordship held the Court had jurisdiction to grant the injunction.
This response might be compared to that of the British Columbia
Board in the British Columbia Hydro case when it was asked to
make a similar declaration.
Ordinarily, the interpretation of collective agreements is within
the primary jurisdiction of an arbitrator appointed under the
agreement (although subject to limited supervisory review by this
Board under Section 108). Because of that, and in view of the
expedited nature of these proceedings we do not believe that this
Panel should express any final judgment at this2 19stage about the
meaning of the Hydro agreements in this re ard.
The rationale for this approach would simply' appear to be that the
Board was concerned that the terms of the collective agreement be
looked at in their proper environment, past practice and the like, and
that arbitration was the forum chosen for this job.
The question of when a Court should take jurisdiction over the
collective agreement is an extremely complex one. Certainly, Hart
217. Id. at 16346
218. Dated October 13, 1976 at 7
219. [1977] CLLC 16066 at 16438
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J. could rely on the decision in the Supreme Court of Canada in
Winnipeg Builders Exchange v. International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, Local 2085220 as the basis for issuing an
injunction based on a strike in breach of the collective agreement.
Subsequently, however, as noted elsewhere in this article, the
Supreme Court in the Brunet case, has categorically stated that the
courts should not get involved in interpreting or applying the
collective agreement.
The answer in the present case may well rest on the fact that the
union admitted a breach of the collective agreement. 22 1 If one
accepts that decisions such as Grottoli22 2 and Hamilton Street
Railway v. Northcott2 23 are still valid authority, one supposes that
Hart J. might say he was in effect enforcing an admitted breach.
Whether an admission is the same as an arbitralconclusion remains
to be decided, as does the current validity of the Winnipeg Builders
Exchange case on this point. In the meantime we may well have to
accept the probable legal basis for the Court's jurisdiction.
In conclusion, the Bowater Mersey case is important as the first
opportunity the Nova Scotia courts have had to consider the breadth
of the strike definition outside the direct employer-employee
context. It is also important in that it should provide some lesson to
counsel in the best tactical way to argue cases involving alleged
breaches of the collective agreement. The problem of political
strikes may arise again in the future and it could be that if this
happens the legislature will feel obliged to step in and broaden the
statutory language. Until that time, however, unions can be content
in the knowledge that at least such collective action will not be in
the breach of the Act.
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